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Abstract 
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 is considered one of the most important event in the history 
of financial markets, leading to a significant change in the perspective of investors. Since 
then, investors look to mitigate their exposure to credit risk, given preferences for instruments 
like exchange traded funds (ETF) which are characterized by low credit risk. Therefore, ETF 
markets have been growing significantly since the financial crisis. Together with this growth, 
increases the relevance of studying the price dynamics experienced by this market. With this 
study, we intend to make an additional contribution in this topic through the analysis of the 
equity and fixed income ETF market in the US. More specifically, we study the patterns of 
overreaction of the equity and fixed income ETF markets in the period 2007-2014. Moreover, 
as far as we know there are not studies approaching overreaction on fixed income ETF 
market. In a complementary basis, we also analyse financial crisis and recovery periods as 
well as bull and bear market periods, separately. Overall, we found higher degree of 
overreaction during the periods in which the market is closed (after-hours periods) than 
during market sessions which could be justified by the lower liquidity level and the 
proportion of informed traders to noise traders in after-hours periods. We also found 
significant differences between financial and recovery periods as well as between bull and 
bear market periods. However, it is important to point out that such results could be 
influenced by the unique period on financial market history approached. On the other hand, 
overreaction is inferred based on the first 24 hours following the extreme price movements 
occur, longer reversals are not captured by this study. Regarding fixed income market, a low 
development level could also influence the results obtained. Forthcoming analysis using 
other time range and other regional markets could be relevant for this topic. 
Key-words: Exchange Traded Funds; Overreaction; Behaviour Finance; Efficient Market 
Hypothesis; Financial Crisis 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis emerged in 2007 and has been followed by a deep recession 
in many countries around the world. The genesis of this crisis was the credit boom, followed 
by the meltdown of sub - prime mortgages and securitized products challenged the financial 
system health. During this unique event, volatility of financial markets increased to the 
highest levels ever seen. Consequently, investors became more defensive and aware to credit 
risk. 
In this context, the risk off environment presented on the market promoted the 
development of instruments characterized by low volatility and low credit risk, such as 
exchange traded funds (ETF). Like mutual funds, these instruments are composed by wide 
index of securities as their underlying. Moreover, ETF are traded as a unique security on a 
stock exchange which constitutes an important factor of differentiation. Investors are able to 
be long or short of an entire portfolio with reduce costs by trading a single security. 
Nevertheless, ETF shareholders are subjected to management fees by the issuer, which 
reduce the potential return (Elton et al., 2002). 
The first US equity ETF appeared in 1993, three years later of the first equity ETF 
which appeared in Canada, while the first non-equity ETF only appeared in 2000 in Canada 
and 2002 in US, so almost 10 years later the first equity ETF. Nowadays, in addition to equity 
and fixed income ETF there are also commodity and currency ETF.  
Currently, ETF industry represents about $3.1 trillion assets under management 
globally with US market representing 74% of the global ETF industry, while Europe and 
Asia comprise 17% and 9%, respectively. Regarding fixed income ETF market, it 
represented, in 2016, $605 billion asset under management, while in 2008 it represented less 
than $100 billion. Equity ETF shows the greatest market share with 75% of the global ETF 
market, following by fixed income, commodity and currency ETF. (JPMorgan, 2016) 
In further accordance with JPMorgan (2016), US-listed ETF industry represents about 
$2,2 trillion in asset distributed across 1,854 ETF, about 9.6% of total US equity market. In 
respect to US fixed income ETF market, it represents $383 billion assets under management.  
As referred before, financial crisis was a turning point for this market. During such 
period, equity ETF represented almost 50% of the total equity trading volume in U.S. market 
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with investors opted for these instruments to protect themselves from volatility presented on 
the market.  
Over the years, new opportunities and new challenges for investors and regulators 
emerged. Thus, this industry raise interest among investors and financial researchers.  
This dissertation studies the patterns of overreaction of equity and fixed income ETF 
since 2007 to 2014 in the US market. In order to understand the impact of financial crisis on 
this market, we also study the financial crisis period and the subsequent recovery period, 
individually. Furthermore, as an extension to that analysis we divide the analysis period 
according to market sentiment: bull and bear market periods.  
Within the two markets approached in this study (equity and fixed income ETF), further 
market distinctions by ETF type may be made, namely sector, international and broad-based 
ETF. While sector ETF focuses on one specific sector, international ETF is composed by 
foreign securities and broad-based ETF is a well diversify index which intends to reflect the 
movement of the entire market. Among them, international ETF is quite popular since it 
allows an exposure to international instruments that for an active investor would be difficult 
to replicate.  
Regarding this issue, studies on financial literature are few. So, this study intends to 
be, in part, an additional contribute for the analysis of equity market’s price dynamics. 
Concerning fixed income ETF market, as far as we know, there are no other studies 
approaching this issue. It is also one aim of this study to be a first contribute for the analysis 
of fixed income market’s returns. It is important to notice that this analysis focuses on the 
beginning of fixed income market development, further studies may be conducted in periods 
with greater liquidity in order to understand if market continues to follow the same trends.   
This analysis is also relevant for investors in order to acquire further knowledge and 
making the right investment decisions according to their profile.  
The results show a significant difference of patterns of overreaction between market 
open hours and after-hours periods. These differences are observed in fixed income and 
equity markets. We also observe, in some cases, a different behaviour of international ETF 
when comparing to other types, suggesting some delay on the incorporation of relevant 
information on price. On the other hand, we conclude a higher level of overreaction during 
financial crisis, mainly on equity market. Also, from the comparative analysis of bull and 
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bear market periods we can conclude that investors’ sentiment seems to play a relevant role 
on ETF’s price dynamics.  
Besides this chapter, this dissertation is structured as follows: in chapter 2 is presented 
the literature review about this subject, previous researchers and different views about returns 
on the market and evolution of ETF prices. Chapter 3 presents data description, empirical 
research of this dissertation and the methodology followed. Afterwards, results could be 
consulted in the chapter 4. Finally, the conclusion of this dissertation is presented in chapter 
5. 
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2. Literature Review 
Over the years, ETF industry has been experiencing an exponential growth reaching 
more $3tn under asset management in 2016 (JPMorgan, 2016). From the beginning in 1990, 
this industry is suffering a huge evolution emerging new and more complex instruments.  
The overreaction phenomenon on financial markets has been widely explored by 
diverse researchers. However, there are few studies approaching overreaction on ETF equity 
market. Additionally, as far as we know, there are no studies about overreaction on ETF fixed 
income market. Therefore, the present analysis becomes a relevant contribute for this issue. 
In this chapter, we explore the wide literature approaching overreaction phenomenon 
by Efficiency Market Hypothesis and Behavioural Finance. Afterwards, we explore the 
existing literature approaching ETF returns and overreaction.  
2.1. Overreaction and Efficiency Market Hypothesis 
The overreaction of securities’ price has been widely discussed in the financial 
literature. According to Efficiency Market Hypothesis (EMH), the price of securities reflects 
their fundamental value, assuming that all investors are rational. Therefore, investors are not 
able to obtain any profit above the normal return using the available information since it is 
already reflected on price. Any deviation from securities’ fundamental value is eliminated in 
a short period of time through arbitrageurs’ activity. They act in the opposite to irrational 
movements on prices until price reflects securities’ fundamental value. Once the past 
information was already incorporated, only the present information could impact the security 
price. Furthermore, market returns are totally randomly and impossible to predict.  
 
“A market is efficient with respect to information set αt if it is impossible to make economic 
profits by trading on the basis of information set αt.” (Jensen, 1978, pp.3). 
 
Nonetheless, in financial market we observe anomalies, such as overreaction or 
momentum effect, which challenge EMH. Deviations of the price from security’s 
fundamental value require a deep analysis being the relation of over - or underreaction with 
lack of efficiency on the market not clear. The market efficiency concept incorporates some 
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individually and unanticipated events that could be responsible for over- or underreaction of 
instrument price (Brown and Warner, 1980). 
“If anomalies split randomly between underreaction and overreaction, they are 
consistent with market efficient.”(Fama (1998), pp.284). 
 
EMH also states that long term reversals should not be consider anomalies: 
“covariation among long term losers seems to be associated with risk premiums that can 
explain the higher future average return than long-term winners” (Fama (1998), pp.287). 
Such anomalies have been also object of study by behaviour finance researchers, who 
defends the existence of consistent anomalies in the market. According to behavioural 
finance theories, prices tend to over-response new information, allowing price deviations 
from securities’ fundamental value in short term. Following such movement, it is expected a 
reversal movement in order to readjust the price to fundamental value. Hence extreme 
positive movement may experience a negative return in a short-term, as well as negative 
extreme movements may be following by a positive return. (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985). 
Moreover, according to Caginalp et al. (2000), overreaction could be explained by 
variations in “liquidity, short-selling, certainty or uncertainty of dividend payments, 
brokerage fees, capital gains taxes, buying on margin, and others” (pp.24). 
Behavioural finance theories are an important contribution to understand such 
phenomenon. Overconfidence theory developed by Odean (1998) defends that the presence 
of overconfident investors has influence on the market. “When there are many overconfident 
traders, markets tend to underreact the information of rational traders. Markets also 
underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information and overreact to salient, 
but less relevant information.” (Odean  (1998), pp.1916). 
On the other hand, investors tend to overweight recent movements of the price in 
detrimental to securities’ fundamental value, according to feedback theory. (Cutleret al., 
1990). Based on the last movements, investors tend to invest in winners stocks making the 
price deviate more from their fundamental values. (DeBondt and Thaler, 1990). 
These theories are in line with representativeness bias theory, developed by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1974). According to this theory, people overestimate the probability of recent 
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patterns observed on the market and underestimate the future perspective of the asset, which 
EMH defends as being the only aspect that influences the prices.  
Additionally, momentum effect developed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) enhance 
some psychology aspects with impact on prices beside security’s fundamental value. They 
defend the existence of some patterns and tendencies that investors usually follow, so the 
market presents some persistently anomalies.  
The following sentence by Barberis and Thaler (2003, pp.1053) describes briefly the 
view of behavioural finance:  
“Behavioural finance argues that some financial phenomena can plausibly be 
understood using models in which some agents are not fully rational. The field has two 
building blocks: limits to arbitrage, which argues that it can be difficult for rational traders 
to undo the dislocations caused by less rational traders; and psychology, which catalogues 
the kinds of deviations from full rationality we might expect to see.” 
 
Over the years, market overreaction has been approached by several empirical studies 
on finance literature. Atkins and Dyl (1990) were one of the first researchers concluding that 
losers earns on average positive returns on the next day. Also, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) 
suggested that after extremely large negative returns, securities tend to experience more than 
expect positive returns over the following two days. Cox and Peterson (1994) studied daily 
returns of NYSE, AMEX and NMS from January 1963 until June 1991. They found 
significant reversals on short-term following extreme price movements equals to, at least, 
10%. However, the degree of reversals wanes through time suggesting that short term 
overreaction tends to disappear with greater liquidity on the market. Larson and Madura 
(2003) studied the same market between 1988 and 1995 concluding that both positive and 
negative extreme returns experienced great negative abnormal returns on the following days. 
In contrast to these studies, Sturm (2003) did not find a significant reaction after negative 
price shocks. 
In further accordance with behavioural financial, the existence of noise uniformed 
traders increases price volatility and anomalies. As suggested by De Long et al. (1990, pp-
705), “the unpredictability of noise traders' future opinions deters arbitrage, prices can 
diverge significantly from fundamental values even when there is no fundamental risk”. Also, 
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lower trading volume on the markets may lead with greater inefficiencies since there are less 
rational traders (informed traders) increasing the possibility of mispricing (Cox and Peterson, 
1994, Daniel et al. (1998)). Richards (1997) concluded greater degree of overreaction on 
higher volatility markets. 
 Nowadays, market liquidity is increasing which result in lower transaction costs. It 
may reduce the number of anomalies occurred as well as the profitability of such anomalies. 
(Chordia et al., 2014). Notwithstanding, it is important to distinguish between market open 
hours and when the market is close. According to Barclay and Henddershot (2004), after-
hours market is less liquid than market open hours with, on average, higher transaction costs. 
Thus, spreads are three to four times larger on after-hours market. Assuming rational 
investors look for lower expensive moment to execute their trades, they concluded that after-
hours market has a higher proportion of uninformed to informed traders comparing to market 
session hours. 
Finally, the growth popularity of hedge fund assets has a positive impact with the decline 
of anomalies, increasing the efficiency of the market. (Chordia et al., 2014). 
2.2. ETF and market efficiency 
As referred previously, this industry is relative recent with a huge evolution since 
financial crisis. For this reason, overreaction on ETF market is not a common topic 
approached by researchers, thus these studies are scarce.  
An important factor is the liquidity on ETF market, particularly in fixed income market. 
More liquid instruments are less susceptible to misprice. In case of low liquid instruments, 
the probability of misprice is higher because there are few investors trading such instruments. 
(Madura and Richie, 2010)  
Additionally, different ETF types may show different returns behaviour. International 
ETF may present higher standard deviation from their net asset value comparing to others 
and greater propensity to overreaction. It could be explained by the lower liquidity, more 
complex arbitrage mechanisms, higher transaction costs and the exposure of this type of ETF 
to other factors for which information is less readily available. On the other hand, sector ETF 
tends to be the less diversified type with exposure to specific risk while broad-based ETF 
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may be less susceptible to mispricing and consequence overreaction, in this case the arbitrage 
process tends to be more efficient (Madura and Richie (2010); Engle and Sarkar (2006)). 
According to EMH, instruments should reflect all available information and some 
mispricing may be quickly eliminated on the market. However, Fulkerson et al.  (2014) 
showed that mispricing on ETF market tends to persist for periods of thirty days which 
suggests some level of inefficiency on the market with no quickly adjustment when net asset 
value changes. Thus, investors can take advantage from such ETF misprice. The researchers 
defended that this mispricing may be explained by a mismatch in timing of net asset value 
calculation and ETF closing prices or cash creation/redeem fees (Fulkerson et al., 2014; 
Madura and Richie, 2010; Rompotis, 2011). 
Madura and Richie (2010) studied patterns of overreaction of equity ETF during the 
bubble of 1998-2002 and concluded the existence of overreaction during this period. They 
found a “substantial reversals on average which implies a correction to investor 
overreaction”. Moreover, such reversals are “consistently more pronounced for ETF that 
experience more extreme stock price movements”. Regarding ETF types, they concluded a 
more pronounced reversal on international ETF. According to researchers informed traders 
take advantages from those who are uninformed and systematically correct their 
overreaction.  
 In further accordance with the article, the authors found significant differences of 
overreaction level between the period when the market is open and when the market is close 
(after-hours market). They concluded that normal-hours triggers experienced greater returns 
than after-hours extreme price movements.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The sample is composed by daily open and close prices of all three types of equity and 
fixed income ETF exchanged on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ Stock 
Market between January 1st, 2007 and December 31st, 2014. The data was obtained from 
Bloomberg database.  
For equity ETF market, we obtain a total of 848 instruments divided by international, 
broad-based and sector ETF, while for fixed income market our sample is composed by 87 
instruments distributed by international and broad-based ETF. During the analysis period, 
there is no fixed income sector ETF traded on both stock markets approached. As already 
mentioned, equity ETF market is more developed than fixed income ETF market during the 
analysed period which justify the differences in the number of instruments between both 
markets. 
The panel A of table 1 presents the composition of our sample of equity ETF. It shows 
that international ETF is the less represented type with almost 28% of total instruments. In 
respect to fixed income market, our sample is composed by more than 80% of broad-based 
ETF. Additionally, about 70% of our sample is composed by sovereign fixed income ETF 
while 30% of them is focuses on corporate debt, as shown on panel B. 
Table 1 Composition of the ETF sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Equity ETF Sample 
Number of EQ ETF 847 (100%) 
Sector 329 (38.8%) 
Broad-Based 285 (33.7%) 
International 233 (27.5%) 
   
Panel B. Fixed Income Sample 
Number of FI ETF 87 (100%) 
Broad-Based 70 (80.5%) 
International 17 (19.5%) 
   
Corporate 26 (29.9%) 
Sovereign 61 (70.1%) 
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3.2. Methodology  
The methodology followed in this dissertation is similar in most respects to the one 
used by Madura and Richie (2010). We also apply the same methodology on ETF fixed 
income market. Therefore, we distinguish a day (24 hours) in two different periods: 1) 
normal-hours period which correspond to market open hours; 2) after-hours period that 
corresponds to the period when market is close. As pointed out in the previous chapter, these 
periods show different characteristics which may be translate in different trading behaviour. 
Thus, an ETF with a normal-hours extreme price movement may experience a reversal in the 
following after-hours period and, in the same line, an after-hours extreme price movement 
may experience a reversal in the following normal-hours period.   
Normal-hours intraday return for period (t) is computed as following: 
𝑅𝑡 = ln⁡(⁡
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
)         (3.1) 
Accordingly, after-hours intraday return for period (t) is given by the following 
expression: 
𝑅𝑡 = ln⁡(⁡
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
)              (3.2) 
For equity market, normal-hours period has delivered lower returns than after-hours 
period, nonetheless they are more volatile as observed by the higher standard deviation in 
returns. The descriptive analysis could be found on panel A of table 2. In respect to fixed 
income market, panel B shows that after-hours period has delivered higher returns than 
normal-hours period. It also shows more volatile returns, as evidence by the higher standard 
deviation.  
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Table 2 - Descriptive analysis ETF returns 
Panel A. Equity ETF returns 
Return 
Normal-hours 
Period 
After-hours 
Period 
Mean -0.04% 0.05% 
Standard Error 1.72% 1.49% 
Skewness -1.17 -2.27 
Minimum -124.06% -204.69% 
Maximum 71.11% 113.94% 
90th Percentile 1.36% 1.27% 
10th Percentile -1.56% -1.23% 
   
Panel B. Fixed Income ETF returns 
Return 
Normal-hours 
Period 
After-hours 
Period 
Mean -0.02% 0.02% 
Standard Error 0.62% 1.01% 
Skewness -3.32 -152.86 
Minimum -69.16% -297.57% 
Maximum 61.90% 69.31% 
90th Percentile 0.42% 0.45% 
10th Percentile -0.47% -0.40% 
Following Madura and Richie (2010), we consider as extreme intraday price 
movements (trigger) all movements which vary at least 5%. Owing their characteristics, ETF 
tend to experience lower volatility.  
The distribution of extreme price fluctuations on equity and fixed income ETF market 
are presented on the following tables 3 and 4, respectively. Regarding equity market, we 
obtain more than 36.000 extreme price fluctuations, with more than 50% of them occurring 
during normal-hours period. Between ETF types, we can find greater extreme price 
movements in broad-based ETF, while international ETF represents only about 15% of total 
observations. For fixed income market, we obtain 582 extreme price movements. Also here, 
more than 50% occurs during normal-hours period.  
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Table 3 - Distribution of equity ETF sample that satisfies the 5% trigger 
 
Winners Losers Total 
 Normal-hours After-hours Normal-hours After-hours 
 
International ETF 1774 20% 2308 26% 2458 28% 2259 26% 8799 100% 
Broad-Based ETF 3565 31% 1904 17% 4165 36% 1787 16% 11421 100% 
Sector ETF 4750 30% 2809 18% 5884 37% 2399 15% 15842 100% 
Entire Sample 10089 28% 7021 19% 12507 35% 6445 18% 36062 100% 
           
 
Total Normal- 
hours 
Total After- 
hours 
Total Winners Total Losers 
  
International ETF 4232 19% 4567 34% 4082 24% 4717 25%   
Broad-Based ETF 7730 34% 3691 27% 5469 32% 5952 31%   
Sector ETF 10634 47% 5208 39% 7559 44% 8283 44%   
Entire Sample 22596 100% 13466 100% 17110 100% 18952 100%   
 
Table 4 - Distribution of fixed income ETF sample that satisfies the 5% trigger 
  Winners Losers Total 
  Normal-hours After-hours Normal-hours After-hours 
International ETF 33 19% 48 28% 69 40% 24 14% 174 100% 
Broad-Based ETF 92 23% 82 20% 165 40% 69 17% 408 100% 
Entire Sample 125 21% 130 22% 234 40% 93 16% 582 100% 
            
  
Total Normal-
hours 
Total After- 
hours 
Total Winners Total Losers 
  
International ETF 102 28% 72 32% 81 32% 93 28%   
Broad-Based ETF 257 72% 151 68% 174 68% 234 72%   
Entire Sample 359 100% 223 100% 255 100% 327 100%   
An eventual correction to extreme fluctuations is analysed during the following two 
periods. Therefore, an eventual correction of normal-hours extreme price movement is 
analysed during the following after-hours period and the next normal-hours period. 
Regarding abnormal returns resulting from extreme price fluctuation we apply the 
mean adjusted return model developed by Brown and Warner (1980). According to this 
model, the expected return is given by a constant K, which is unique for each security (i) in 
a specific period:  
E(𝑅𝑖𝑡)=𝐾⁡𝑖.           (3.3) 
The expected return for a security in the extreme price movement day (t) is calculated 
as a mean of return of a period (T) that begin 255-days and finish 15 days before triggers’ 
period (t). The formula of expected return for each security (i) is described bellow: 
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𝐾𝑖,?̂? =
1
𝑁+1
Σ𝑇=𝑡−255
𝑇 (𝑅𝑖,𝑡)                   (3.4) 
The abnormal return of security (i) for a specific period (𝐴𝑖,𝑡) is given by: 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐾𝑖?̂?)                      (3.5) 
The test statistic for abnormal return is computed following a student's t-distribution. 
Furthermore, we test a multivariate model for both markets. Based on our literature 
review, overreaction is conditional to several variables. Madura and Richie (2010) studied 
the impact on overreaction of several variables: ETF type, size of trigger, period of the day 
of extreme price movement, volume traded on trigger day and volatility over the past 90 days 
before trigger. Unlike Madura and Richie (2010), in our model, we do not consider the 
absolute values of volatility and volume occurred during event-study, but rather the abnormal 
values of volume and volatility. For that, we apply the same methodology used for abnormal 
returns, already pointed out in this chapter. The use of abnormal volatility and volume allow 
us to understand the impact of abnormal movements of volatility and volume on degree of 
overreaction. 
Additionally, we include other variables such as year of the abnormal return, market 
sentiment (see appendix I) and tax effect on price. 
For equity market, we apply the following multivariate model: 
ARi =⁡β0 +⁡β1AFTERHOURSi + β2LOSDUMi +⁡β3TRIGGERi +⁡⁡β4INTLDUMi +
⁡β5SECTDUMi +⁡β6ABN_VOLATILITYi +⁡⁡β7ABN_VOLUMEi +⁡⁡β8BULLDUMi +
⁡β9TAXDUMi + β10⁡Year08⁡ +⁡β11⁡Year09 + β12⁡Year10⁡ + β13⁡Year11⁡ +
β14⁡Year12⁡ + β15⁡Year13⁡ +⁡β16⁡Year14 +⁡ε⁡⁡i⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(3.6) 
Where, dependent variable, AR, represents the abnormal return on the following period 
after trigger occurs, AFTERHOURS is a dummy variable which assumes value of 1 on after-
hours extreme price movement and 0 otherwise. Dummy variable LOSDUM is equal to 1 in 
case of negative extreme price movement and 0 otherwise. TRIGGER variable measures the 
extreme price movement experienced by instrument while INTLDUM is a dummy variable 
that equals to 1 in case of international ETF and 0 otherwise. Along the same line, 
SECTDUM is a dummy where 1 represents a sector ETF and 0 otherwise. 
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ABN_VOLATILITY is the abnormal standard deviation of returns observed over the past 90 
days before extreme price movement occurs. ABN_VOLUME presents the abnormal volume 
of shares trading during a trigger day. BULLDUM is another dummy variable that assumes 
value of 1 if it is a bull market period trigger and 0 otherwise. Finally, TAXDUM measures 
the tax effect and assumes value of 1 if abnormal returns occur during December or January 
months and 0 otherwise. 
In order to run the model for each individual type of ETF we have to adapt the model 
through the exclusion of ETF type dummies, namely INTLDUM and SECTDUM.  
For fixed income market, we include another dummy variable, CORPDUM which 
equals 1 if the ETF is exposed to corporate bonds and 0 otherwise. Corporate ETF may 
represent different sensibility since corporate and sovereign represents different risk profiles 
and characteristics (Elton at al.,1999). In this case, we do not include SECTDUM variable 
since there is no sector ETF on fixed income market. The model is expressed following:  
ARj =⁡β0 +⁡β1AFTERHOURSi + β2LOSDUMi +⁡β3TRIGGERi +⁡⁡β4INTLDUMi +
⁡β5CORPDUMi +⁡β6ABN_VOLATILITYi +⁡⁡β7ABN_VOLUMEi +⁡⁡β8BULLDUMi +
β9TAXDUMi + β10Year08⁡ + β11⁡Year09 + β12Year10⁡ + β13Year11⁡ + β14Year12⁡ +
β15Year13⁡ + β16Year14 +⁡εi⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(3.7) 
Like equity market model, we adjust fixed income multivariate model for testing the 
sensibility of abnormal return by ETF type, dropping the INTLDUM dummy variable. Also, 
in equity and fixed income cases, we adapt multivariate models in order to isolate the 
abnormal returns occurred during normal-hours and after-hours periods. We also distinguish 
between losers (negative extreme movement price) and winners (positive extreme movement 
price).  
Both models presented above are testing according the ordinary least squares model 
(OLS) since it is the most appropriate model for our sample (see appendix II). They are also 
testing for heteroscedasticity and corrected using White’s test (1980). 
In a complementary basis to our analysis, we divide our period analysis into financial 
crisis and recovery periods. For that, we use the periods defined by Madura et al (2009). 
According to the mentioned authors, financial crisis began at October 9th, 2007 and finished 
at March 9th, 2009. The recovery period is defined from that date until December 31st, 2014.  
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Afterwards, as an extension of this analysis, we divide our sample period according 
market sentiment: bull and bear market periods. For that, we apply the methodology defined 
by Pagan and Sossounov (2003) (see appendix I). During these market periods, the investor 
attitude towards risk tends to be different resulting in different behaviours according to 
market sentiment. Through this analysis, we intend to analyse the impact of market sentiment 
on ETF market returns. 
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4. Results 
In this chapter, we present the results for equity and fixed income ETF markets. Firstly, 
in each sub-chapter is presented the results of abnormal returns estimation for two periods 
following an extreme price movement using the entire sample period (2007-2014) and the 
results obtained from the multivariate analysis. Afterwards, we present the results of the 
estimation for financial crisis and recovery periods as well as the estimation for bull and bear 
market periods.  
4.1. Overreaction on ETF Equity Market 
4.1.1. Overreaction during normal-hours and after-hours period 
The table 5 shows the results for the estimation of abnormal returns when extreme price 
movements (trigger) occur during normal-hours period. In this case, we consider all sample 
period since 2007 until 2014. The second column of the table shows the mean abnormal 
return resulting from extreme price movements. The third and fourth columns represent the 
mean abnormal return occurred in the two following periods. Stress that, in this case, period 
1 corresponds to the following after-hours period and period 2 corresponds the next normal-
hours period. The mean abnormal return of these two periods could be found on the fifth 
column. The t-statistics and levels of significance appear in parentheses. The proportions of 
the overreaction reversed in the following period and in the following 24 hours period are 
shown on the sixth and seventh column, respectively. Stress that a positive number means 
that on subsequent period there is an extension of extreme abnormal return instead of a 
correction. Additionally, we consider three different minimum levels of triggers, namely, 
5%, 6% and 7%, in order to observe returns behaviour as more restrictive our sample became. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 5 - Full sample abnormal returns following normal-hours equity triggers 
 Normal-
hours 
After-hours Normal-hours 24 Hours 
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
Period 
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
hours Period 
 Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A.  Winners    
Trigger=>5% 7.67% 0.28% -0.60% -0.32% 3.70% -4.17% 
(N = 10089 ) ( 95.82)*** ( 7.34)*** ( -3.28)*** ( -6.36)***   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 47%:53%    
Trigger=>6% 8.91% 0.33% -0.84% -0.51% 3.72% -5.75% 
(N = 6212 ) ( 75.94)*** ( 6.47)*** ( -3.04)*** ( -18.14)***   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 46%:54%    
Trigger=>7% 10.10% 0.33% -1.07% -0.74% 3.28% -7.31% 
(N = 4049 ) ( 61.57)*** ( 5.41)*** ( -2.66)*** ( 11.52)***   
 100%;0% 49%:51% 44%:56%    
  
Panel B. Losers  
Trigger<=-5% -7.47% -0.03% 0.66% 0.63% 0.46% -8.44% 
(N = 12507 ) ( -95.20)*** ( 3.94)*** ( 13.25)*** ( 8.58)***   
 0%;100% 52%:48% 58%:42%    
Trigger<=-6% -8.70% -0.11% 0.77% 0.65% 1.29% -7.50% 
(N = 8057 ) ( -75.91)*** ( 3.28)*** ( 11.37)*** ( -2.44)**   
 0%;100% 51%:49% 59%:41%    
Trigger<=-7% -9.93% -0.19% 0.86% 0.67% 1.90% -6.78% 
(N = 5391 ) ( -61.82)*** ( 2.78)*** ( 9.76)*** ( 28.25)***   
 0%;100% 50%:50% 59%:41%    
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics. 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
As shown on Panel A of table 5, about 50% of extreme positive price fluctuations 
(winners) experience negative return on the following after-hours period, regardless the 
trigger considers. In period 2, this proportion increase slightly. However, we do not observe 
mean reversion on period 1. Only period 2 shows significant negative abnormal return. The 
proportion reverted after 24 hours of trigger occurs varies between 4.17% and 7.13% as we 
consider a trigger of 5% and 7%, respectively.   
Like winners, about 50% of negative extreme price variations (losers) experience 
positive abnormal returns on the following period. Also, in this case, period 1 do not show 
mean reversion. The size of such reversal following 24 hours varies between 8.44% and 
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6.78% as the trigger increase. Thus, a lower degree of overreaction is observed as the extreme 
abnormal return increases.  
The results for extreme abnormal returns estimation during after-hours period show a 
different behaviour than observed previously on normal-hours estimation. The results are 
shown on table 6. Stress that, in this case, period 1 corresponds to the next normal-hours and 
the following after-hours period correspond to period 2. 
Table 6 - Full sample abnormal returns following after-hours equity triggers 
 After-hours Normal-hours After-hours 24 Hours Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
Period  
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
24 Hours 
Period   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A. Winners 
Trigger=>5% 7.50% -1.73% -0.07% -1.80% -23.09% -24.02% 
(N = 7021 ) ( 78.20)*** ( -14.00)*** ( 2.60)*** ( -23.60)***   
 100%;0% 43%:57% 46%:54%    
Trigger=>6% 8.75% -2.46% -0.05% -2.50% -28.05% -28.60% 
(N = 4388 ) ( 62.76)*** ( -13.53)*** ( 2.86)*** ( -38.23)***   
 100%;0% 39%:61% 46%:54%    
Trigger=>7% 9.97% -3.38% -0.01% -3.38% -33.86% -33.92% 
(N = 2888 ) ( 51.38)*** ( -13.44)*** ( 2.92)*** ( -10.77)***   
 100%;0% 35%:65% 46%:54%  
  
 
Panel B. Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -7.53% 1.41% 0.44% 1.85% -18.80% -24.64% 
(N = 6445 ) ( -68.89)*** ( 16.70)*** ( 7.36)*** ( 20.64)***   
 0%;100% 31%:69% 28%:72%    
Trigger<=-6% -8.94% 1.94% 0.52% 2.46% -21.72% -27.53% 
(N = 3827 ) ( -53.81)*** ( 15.31)*** ( 6.27)*** ( 17.80)***   
 0%;100% 62%:38% 54%:46%    
Trigger<=-7% -10.32% 2.67% 0.56% 3.23% -25.85% -31.26% 
(N = 2437 ) ( -43.33)*** ( 14.62)*** ( 5.21)*** ( 37.18)***   
 0%;100% 65%:35% 54%:46%    
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics. 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
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The results show that after positive triggers, on average, returns revert about 23% on 
the following period, with more than 57% of total extreme positive price movements 
experience negative abnormal returns, considering a trigger of 5%. The size of mean reversal 
increases as the trigger increases: 28.05% and 33.86% considering a trigger of 6% and 7%, 
respectively. 
Losers show a small difference in the proportion reverted following extreme abnormal 
returns with 59% of that experiencing positive abnormal return for a trigger of 5%. 
Considering the same trigger, following 24 hours we observe a significant mean abnormal 
return of 1.85% and significance at the 1% level. The proportion of overreaction reversed in 
the following 24 hours varies from 24.02% to 33.92% as the minimum trigger increases. 
Unlike normal-hours, the level of overreaction increases with the size of extreme abnormal 
returns.  
Overall, we observe significant differences on responses to extreme price movements 
between normal-hours and after-hours periods. While normal-hours extreme price 
movements do not experience, on average, any reversion on period 1, after-hours extreme 
abnormal returns show, for the same period, a significant mean reversion of 23.09% for 
winners and 18.80% for losers, considering a trigger of 5%. Therefore, the differences on 
responses following extreme abnormal returns are presented on the table 7. 
Table 7 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following 
Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic 
Normal-hours Trigger 
After-hours 
Trigger 
5% winner 0.28% -1.73% 2.01% ( 23.42)*** 
6% winner 0.33% -2.46% 2.79% ( 22.15)*** 
7% winner 0.33% -3.38% 3.71% ( 20.96)*** 
5% loser -0.03% 1.41% -1.45% ( -10.71)*** 
6% loser -0.11% 1.94% -2.05% ( -10.07)*** 
7% loser -0.19% 2.67% -2.86% ( -10.03)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
For three levels of triggers considered, we find significant differences at the 1% level. 
The greater level of triggers used, higher mean differences between two periods is founded.  
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4.1.2. Overreaction of different ETF Types 
Once the results may differ by ETF type, in this sub-chapter we present the estimation 
of extreme abnormal returns for each type. In this analysis is only considering the trigger of 
5%. 
As shown on table 8, during normal-hours period the results for broad-based and sector 
winners show no mean reversion on Period 1 while international ETF experience a slight 
reversion. This type also experiences the greatest size of reversal following 24 hours for both 
winners and losers while broad-based ETF shows the lowest degree of overreaction. This 
result is in line with our expectations since broad-based ETF presents the highest level of 
diversification so may be less sensitive to deviations from its fundamental value. 
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Table 8 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers by ETF types 
  
Normal 
Hours After Hours 
Normal 
Hours 24 Hours 
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following Period 
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 7.44% -0.07% -0.59% -0.66% -0.98% -8.87% 
(N = 1774 ) ( 39.00 )*** ( -0.46 ) ( -6.21 )*** ( -4.77)***   
 100%;0% 46%:54% 47%:53%    
Broad Based ETF 7.53% 0.41% -0.58% -0.17% 5.47% -2.20% 
(N = 3565 ) ( 55.95 )*** ( 5.01 )*** ( -8.69 )*** ( -2.42)**   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 49%:51%    
Sector ETF 7.87% 0.32% -0.63% -0.31% 4.07% -3.93% 
(N = 4750 ) ( 67.35 )*** ( 4.54 )*** ( -10.77 )*** ( -4.25)***   
 100%;0% 51%:49% 46%:54%    
Losers       
International ETF -7.21% 0.23% 0.54% 0.77% -3.18% -10.65% 
(N = 2458 ) ( -40.67 )*** ( 2.39 )** ( 4.23 )*** ( 4.81)***   
 0%;100% 54%:46% 59%:41%    
Broad Based ETF -7.51% -0.30% 0.68% 0.39% 3.96% -5.13% 
(N = 4165 ) ( -55.29 )*** ( -3.55 )*** ( 7.43 )*** ( 2.62)***   
 0%;100% 51%:49% 58%:42%    
Sector ETF -7.55% 0.04% 0.70% 0.75% -0.56% -9.88% 
(N = 5884 ) ( -66.00 )*** ( 0.89 ) ( 9.15 )*** ( 7.19)***   
 0%;100% 52%:48% 57%:43%    
Panel B – After-hours 
Winners       
International ETF 7.34% -0.91% -0.27% -1.18% -12.41% -16.11% 
(N = 2308 ) ( 43.92 )*** ( -8.41 )*** ( -3.96 )*** ( -9.15)***   
 100%;0% 48%:52% 45%:55%    
Broad Based ETF 7.53% -1.76% -0.07% -1.83% -23.35% -24.33% 
(N = 1904 ) ( 40.91 )*** ( -14.88 )*** ( -1.81 )* ( -12.50)***   
 100%;0% 43%:57% 45%:55%    
Sector ETF 7.60% -2.39% 0.10% -2.29% -31.39% -30.08% 
(N = 2809 ) ( 50.14 )*** ( -24.59 )*** ( -0.30 ) ( -18.73)***   
 100%;0% 39%:61% 47%:53%    
    Losers       
International ETF -7.32% 0.76% 0.48% 1.24% -10.34% -16.96% 
(N = 2259 ) ( -39.61 )*** ( 7.20 )*** ( 3.52 )*** ( 7.93)***   
 0%;100% 56%:44% 58%:42%    
Broad Based ETF -7.49% 1.49% 0.41% 1.90% -19.91% -25.36% 
(N = 1787 ) ( -36.08 )*** ( 12.48 )*** ( 2.46 )** ( 11.15)***   
 0%;100% 60%:40% 53%:47%    
Sector ETF -7.75% 1.98% 0.42% 2.40% -25.52% -30.94% 
(N = 2399 ) ( -43.33 )*** ( 19.13 )*** ( 2.97 )*** ( 16.52)***   
 0%;100% 63%:37% 53%:47%    
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics. 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
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On panel B is shown the estimation for after-hours extreme prices movements. In this 
case, sector ETF experiences higher mean reversion on period 1 following a trigger. On the 
other hand, international ETF shows the lowest size of overreaction between the three types. 
Owing their characteristics, the process to incorporate relevant information is different from 
the other types. Differences of mean reversals after extreme price movements by types of 
ETF are summarized on table 9. 
Table 9 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns between ETF types 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
 International 
ETF 
Sector ETF 
Broad-
Based ETF 
Normal-hours Winners -0.07% 0.32% 0.41% 
Normal-hours Losers 0.23% 0.04% -0.30% 
After-hours Winners -0.91% -2.39% -1.76% 
After-hours Losers 0.76% 1.98% 1.49% 
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return 
 AR intl - AR 
sector 
AR intl - 
AR broad 
AR sector - 
AR broad 
Normal-hours Winners -0.55% -0.58% -0.03% 
 ( -3.41 )*** ( -4.01 )*** ( -1.04 ) 
Normal-hours Losers 0.23% 0.52% 0.28% 
 ( 1.06 ) ( 3.09 )*** ( 1.80 )* 
After-hours Winners 1.71% 0.54% -0.89% 
 ( 10.37 )*** ( 3.17 )*** ( -6.18 )*** 
After-hours Losers -1.31% -0.45% 0.92% 
 ( -8.56 )*** ( -3.24 )*** ( 5.09 )*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
Major differences are observed between international and sector ETF during after-
hours periods, following by the difference between sector and broad-based ETF. Regarding 
normal-hours periods, international and broad-based ETF experience the greatest difference. 
All these differences are significant at the 1% level.  
4.1.3. Multivariate analysis 
In this sub-chapter is presented the results from multivariate model in order to assess 
the sensibility of reversals following an extreme price movement to different explanatory 
variables. This analysis is divided by winners and losers’ observations as well as normal-
hours and after-hours triggers. The results are presented on table 10. 
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Table 10 - Multivariate equity market model ETF1 
 Overall Model Normal-hours After-hours Winners Losers 
AFTERHOURS -0.002***   -0.021*** 0.016*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSDUM -0.022*** 0.000 -0.038***   
 (0.000) (0.940) (0.009)   
TRIGGER -0.213*** 0.022* -0.458*** -0.377*** -0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
INTLDUM 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 
 (0.247) (0.212) (0.680) (0.136) (0.986) 
SECTDUM 0.000 0.001** -0.001 -0.001* 0.003*** 
 (0.644) (0.017) (0.447) (0.088) (0.000) 
BULLDUM 0.001 -0.002* 0.003* -0.001 0.001 
 (0.410) (0.069) (0.083) (0.383) (0.289) 
TAXDUM 0.003*** 0.001* 0.003* -0.009*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.063) (0.097) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABN_VOLUME 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000** 
 (0.770) (0.817) (0.186) (0.443) (0.022) 
ABN_VOLATILITY -0.005 0.021 -0.005 0.002 -0.169*** 
 (0.356) (0.298) (0.304) (0.395) (0.000) 
Year08 0.000 -0.005*** 0.011** 0.011*** -0.008*** 
 (0.760) (0.123) (0.277) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year09 -0.000 -0.003** 0.008 0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.987) (0.001) (0.038) (0.000) (0.007) 
Year10 0.001 -0.003** 0.011** 0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.893) (0.047) (0.133) (0.003) (0.009) 
Year11 0.001 -0.004** 0.009* 0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.770) (0.038) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year12 0.001 -0.003 0.009* 0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.619) (0.025) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year13 0.001 -0.002 0.008 0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.660) (0.133) (0.093) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year14 -0.001 -0.003 0.006 0.014*** -0.017*** 
 (0.566) (0.312) (0.158) (0.003) (0.007) 
Constant 0.010*** 0.004** 0.007 0.023*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.480) (0.000) (0.445) 
      
Observations 36,062 22,596 13,466 17,110 18,952 
Adj r-squared 0.034 0.002 0.141 0.102 0.042 
F 25.34 4.666 62.33 54.35 42.57 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                                                          
1The dependent variable is the abnormal return following extreme price movements. Dummy variable 
AFTERHOURS equals one if the trigger occurs on after-hours period and zero otherwise. LOSDUM assumes 
one, in case of losers triggers and zero otherwise. TRIGGER variable measure the extreme price fluctuations 
observed. The variable ABN_VOLUME corresponds to the abnormal volume traded on trigger day measured 
by the difference between volume on trigger day and the mean of volume traded over the last 255 days ending 
15 prior the trigger. Based on the same methodology is computed ABN_VOLATILITY variable which refers 
to the abnormal standard deviation of returns observed over the past ninety days before trigger. The dummy 
variable BULLDUM assumes value of one if extreme price movement occurs during a bull market period and 
zero otherwise. TAXDUM takes the value of one if trigger occurs during December or January months and 0 
otherwise. YEAR09 assumes value of one if the trigger occurs during 2009 and zero otherwise. The same is 
true for dummies variables: YEAR10, YEAR11, YEAR12, YEAR13 and YEAR14. See chapter 3 for details. 
Robust pval in parentheses. *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Normal-hours model shows a coefficient for TRIGGER of 0.022 meaning that only 
2.2% of abnormal return on the period 1 is explained by extreme price movements, ceteris 
paribus, with significance at the 10% level. A positive coefficient suggests that higher 
extreme price movements tend to present lower levels of overreaction which corroborates 
our previous estimations.  
The after-hours model shows a TRIGGER coefficient of -0.458 indicating that 45.8% 
of the abnormal return on period 1 is preceded by the extreme price movement, ceteris 
paribus. Moreover, a negative LOSDUM dummy on after-hours model and significant at the 
1% level indicates a more pronounced correction on the following period in case of winners, 
with other factors constants. 
On the other hand, winners and losers’ models show that after-hours extreme price 
movements suffer a less favourable mean reversion than normal-hours extreme price 
movements. In both models, AFTERHOURS dummy variable is significant at the 1% level. 
Also, both models show a significant TAXDUM dummy variable at the 1% level, suggesting 
that the level of overreaction is less favourable during December and January months, with 
other factors constants. In case of winners model, a TRIGGER coefficient variable equals to 
-0.377 suggests that 37.7% of abnormal return on the following period is explained by 
winners extreme price movements, ceteris paribus, while losers model reports a coefficient 
for such variable equals to -0.115. 
It is also important to emphasize that all models are significant at the 1% level. 
However, normal-hours model shows a reduce predictability power. It could suggest that this 
market presents a higher level of efficiency during normal-hours periods. Thus, we are not 
able to predict the abnormal return. Nonetheless, it could also means that the behaviour of 
noise traders have a randomly impact on the market, so abnormal returns that arise from their 
activity affect all ETF market being not possible to predict by analysing to different variables. 
Afterwards, we analyse a multivariate model for each ETF type and the results are 
presented on table 11.  
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Table 11 - Multivariate equity market model by ETF Type2 
 Panel A - International ETF Panel B- Sector ETF Panel C- Broad-Based ETF 
 
Normal-
hours 
After-
hours 
Winners Losers 
Normal-
hours 
After-
hours 
Winners Losers 
Normal-
hours 
After-
hours 
Winners Losers 
AFTERHOURS   -0.008*** 0.006***   -0.027*** 0.020***   -0.022*** 0.019*** 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSDUM 0.009** -0.067***   -0.003 -0.008   0.001 -0.063***   
 (0.019) (0.000) 
  (0.202) (0.675)   (0.750) (0.000)   
TRIGGER 0.042 -0.567*** -0.414*** -0.197** -0.004 -0.339** -0.371*** -0.072 0.053*** -0.632*** -0.399*** -0.160*** 
 (0.122) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.843) (0.012) (0.000) (0.106) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BULLDUM -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.005* -0.002 0.009** 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.255) (0.425) (0.177) (0.067) (0.235) (0.014) (0.870) (0.448) (0.407) (0.752) (0.305) (0.984) 
TAXDUM 0.001 0.007*** -0.012*** 0.016*** 0.001 0.004 -0.008*** 0.013*** 0.002** -0.001 -0.013*** 0.017*** 
 (0.519) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.522) (0.165) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.865) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABN_VOLUME 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.335) (0.210) (0.071) (0.151) (0.805) (0.068) (0.106) (0.703) (0.544) (0.197) (0.004) (0.186) 
ABN_VOLATILITY 0.007 -0.187* 0.264*** -0.287*** 0.024 -0.003 -0.001 -0.085** 0.030 -0.468*** 0.191*** -0.270*** 
 (0.930) (0.072) (0.002) (0.001) (0.386) (0.253) (0.450) (0.034) (0.368) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year08 -0.008*** 0.006 0.003 -0.007 -0.009*** 0.020** 0.011*** -0.006 0.002 0.001 0.011*** -0.012** 
 (0.421) (0.967) (0.050) (0.001) (0.003) (0.736) (0.005) (0.000) (0.563) (0.609) (0.000) (0.012) 
Year09 -0.005* -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007*** 0.021*** 0.008** -0.004 0.003 -0.007 0.008** -0.012** 
 (0.009) (0.444) (0.579) (0.160) (0.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.103) (0.599) (0.935) (0.000) (0.031) 
Year10 -0.006* 0.001 0.011* -0.017*** -0.007*** 0.024*** 0.007** -0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.011*** -0.015*** 
 (0.083) (0.745) (0.338) (0.136) (0.000) (0.008) (0.015) (0.313) (0.358) (0.331) (0.017) (0.021) 
Year11 -0.005 0.003 0.012* -0.017*** -0.009*** 0.017** 0.013*** -0.013*** 0.004 -0.003 0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.071) (0.874) (0.070) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.028) (0.400) (0.535) (0.279) (0.001) (0.009) 
Year12 -0.006 -0.001 0.010 -0.020*** -0.006** 0.017* 0.008** -0.005 0.002 -0.007 0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.132) (0.739) (0.051) (0.001) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.001) (0.283) (0.665) (0.000) (0.004) 
Year13 -0.003 0.002 0.010 -0.016*** -0.006*** 0.007 0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.211) (0.921) (0.121) (0.000) (0.011) (0.056) (0.030) (0.342) (0.585) (0.322) (0.000) (0.006) 
Year14 -0.005 -0.000 0.013** -0.020*** -0.007*** 0.003 0.011*** -0.016*** 0.002 -0.004 0.015*** -0.017** 
 (0.453) (0.820) (0.106) (0.004) (0.009) (0.440) (0.460) (0.219) (0.432) (0.607) (0.328) (0.787) 
Constant 0.003 0.030*** 0.025*** -0.003 0.011*** -0.019 0.023*** -0.001 -0.002 0.037*** 0.023*** -0.002 
 (0.372) (0.002) (0.002) (0.662) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000) (0.820) (0.458) (0.000) (0.000) (0.658)              
Observations 4,232 4,567 4,082 4,717 10,634 5,208 7,559 8,283 7,730 3,691 5,469 5,952 
Adj r-squared 0.0001 0.1298 0.0738 0.0347 0.0016 0.1388 0.1125 0.0444 0.0115 0.2061 0.1257 0.0575 
F 1.596 14.47 10.18 11.29 3.571 42.97 35.74 22.18 6.753 30.01 26.31 20.64 
Prob>F 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                                                          
2The dependent variable is the abnormal return following extreme price movements. Dummy variable AFTERHOURS equals one if the trigger occurs on after-hours 
period and zero otherwise. LOSDUM assumes one,in case of losers triggers and zero otherwise. TRIGGER variable measure the extreme price fluctuations observed. 
The variable ABN_VOLUME corresponds to the abnormal volume traded on trigger day measured by the difference between volume on trigger day and the mean of 
volume traded over the last 255 days ending 15 prior the trigger. Based on the same methodology is computed ABN_VOLATILITY variable which refers to the abnormal 
standard deviation of returns observed over the past ninety days before trigger. The dummy variable BULLDUM assumes value of one if extreme price movement occurs 
during a bull market period and zero otherwise. TAXDUM takes the value of one if trigger occurs during December or January months and 0 otherwise. YEAR09 
assumes value of one if the trigger occurs during 2009 and zero otherwise. The same is true for dummies variables: YEAR10, YEAR11, YEAR12, YEAR13 and 
YEAR14. See chapter 3 for details. Robust pval in parentheses. *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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For normal-hours international ETF model, LOSDUM is positive and significant at the 
5% level suggesting that the responses to normal-hours extreme abnormal returns are more 
pronounced in case of winners than for losers triggers, with other factors constants. On after-
hours model, a TRIGGER coefficient equals to -0.567 indicates that after-hours extreme price 
movements of international ETF explain about 56.7% of abnormal return on the following 
period, ceteris paribus. It is significant at the 1% level. Winners and losers models show 
sensibility of dependent variable to abnormal volatility with significance at the 1% level which 
suggest that the level of abnormal volatility influence the level of overreaction experience by 
this type of ETF, with other factors constants. TAXDUM variable is also significant at the 1% 
level in both models.  
Regarding sector ETF, after-hours model shows a TRIGGER coefficient equals to -
0.339, at the 5% level of significance. Also, BULLDUM dummy variable is positive and 
significant at the 5% level which indicates that overreaction following an extreme after-hours 
trigger is less favourable during bull market than during bear market periods, with other factor 
constants. Losers model shows a positive and significant AFTERHOURS dummy variable 
suggesting higher degree of correction tend to occur following after-hours triggers, with other 
factors constants. The same conclusion is achieved in case of winners model. This result 
corroborates previous estimation results.  
In case of broad-based ETF, a TRIGGER coefficient equals to -0.632 on after-hours 
model suggests that more than 63% of extreme abnormal return during after-hours period is 
reverted during the following period, ceteris paribus, at the 1% level of significance. Normal-
hours model shows a TRIGGER variable equals to 0.053, at the 1% level of significance. Like 
international ETF, also broad-based ETF winners and losers models show significance at 
ABN_VOLATILITY variable, at the 1% level of significance. 
Overall, we conclude different behaviours between normal-hours and after-hours 
periods. It could be observed on our estimations results and, also, in our multivariate models. 
Our results show that the degree of overreaction is greater on after-hours periods for both 
winners and losers and for the three types of ETF.  
Furthermore, our estimation for normal-hours period shows no mean reversal during 
period 1 following extreme price movements. Additionally, winners after-hours triggers show 
greater level of overreaction following extreme abnormal return than in case of losers.  
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The analysis by ETF types allows us to conclude that international ETF show the greatest 
size of reversion among all three types following normal-hours triggers, while during after-
hours period they show the lowest degree of overreaction. This may be justified by the 
composition of the underlying, foreign assets, so the news are not available and incorporate at 
the same time as the other types.  
Through the multivariable models analysis, we conclude a significant sensibility to the 
sign and magnitude of extreme price movement and to tax effects. It also shows greater 
sensibility to such explanatory variables on after-hours and winners models. 
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4.1.4. Overreaction and Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 was the most important event in the last decade for 
financial markets, putting in evidence the credit risk presented on the market. Consequently, 
investors started to look for low credit risk instruments in order to mitigate their potential 
losses. As previous mentioned this event has a turning point for ETF market, owing its 
characteristics such as diversification and low transaction costs. 
In this sub-chapter, we aim to understand ETF returns behaviour during and after such 
unique event. For that, we define the financial period and, subsequently recovery based on 
Madura et al (2009). According to them, financial crisis lasted from October 9th, 2007 until 
March 9th, 2009 and the recovery period began at March 9th, 2009 until December 31st, 2014. 
Overall, 99% of our full extreme abnormal returns sample occurred during these two 
periods, where more than 60% occurred during financial crisis period. A more detail 
distribution of winners and losers across normal-hours and after-hours periods divided by 
financial crisis and recovery periods could be found on annex III. 
a) Overreaction on financial crisis period 
Following the same line as full sample period analysis, firstly we present the abnormal 
return estimation results for normal-hours and after-hours periods. Afterwards, we estimate 
the degree of overreaction by ETF type. In this case, both estimations consider a trigger level 
equals to 5%.  
The results for the full sample estimation of overreaction after an extreme price 
movement could be found on Table 12. 
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Table 12 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers during financial crisis period 
    24 Hours Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 
Period  
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period  
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period 1-2) 
Panel A. Normal-hours 
Winners 
Trigger=>5% 8.00% 0.42% -0.65% -0.23% 5.20% -2.92% 
(N = 6058 ) ( 74.29)*** ( 6.02)*** ( -11.10)*** ( -3.31)***   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 48%:52%  
  
Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -7.80% -0.16% 0.56% 0.40% 2.09% -5.08% 
(N = 7874 ) ( -72.61)*** ( -2.12)** ( 7.42)*** ( 3.66)***   
 0%;100% 50%:50% 58%:42%  
  
     
  
Panel B. After-hours 
Winners     
  
Trigger=>5% 7.91% -2.48% 0.10% -2.38% -31.35% -30.08% 
(N = 3940 ) ( 59.26)*** ( -26.95)*** ( -0.14) ( -2.67)***   
 100%;0% 39%:61% 48%:52%  
  
Losers     
  
Trigger<=-5% -7.87% 2.15% 0.42% 2.57% -27.33% -32.69% 
(N = 3706 ) ( -50.25)*** ( 23.18)*** ( 3.52)*** ( 2.51)**   
 0%;100% 66%:34% 51%:49%  
  
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics. 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
Normal-hours extreme price fluctuations do not experience mean reversion on period 1 
in cases of winners and losers. In total of two periods following trigger we observe a slightly 
mean reversion equals to 2.92% in case of winners and equals to 5.08% in case of losers. Both 
values are significant at the 1% level.  
In the same line that full sample estimation, after-hours abnormal returns experience 
greater degree of overreaction than normal-hours triggers. Both winners and losers experience 
a significant mean reversion on the period following the extreme abnormal return. Following 
24 hours period after trigger occurs, the size of reversal is more than 30% for both winners 
and losers. The differences between normal-hours and after-hours mean reversals are reflected 
on table 13.  
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Table 13 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal return during financial crisis period 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following  
Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic Normal-hours 
Trigger 
After-hours 
Trigger 
5% winner 0.42% -2.48% 2.90% ( -0.25) 
5% loser -0.16% 2.15% -2.31% ( -37.76)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-
tailed test for significance. 
On losers side, the difference of mean abnormal return on period 1 is equal to -2.31% 
and significant at the 1% level. For winners, the difference is equal to 2.90% however it is not 
statistically significant.  
Regarding ETF types, the abnormal return estimation results show greater significant 
abnormal returns following after-hours triggers for all three types, with international ETF 
experiencing the lowest mean reversal. It is true for winners and losers. While following 
normal-hours trigger, international ETF are the only type that shows a slight reversal on period 
1. A summary of abnormal returns after a trigger and the differences between the three types 
are shown on table 14.  
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Table 14 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns between ETF types 
during financial crisis period 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
  
International 
ETF 
Sector ETF 
Broad-Based 
ETF 
Normal-hours Winners -0.08% 0.44% 0.62% 
Normal-hours Losers 0.18% -0.09% -0.45% 
After-hours Winners -1.23% -3.08% -2.85% 
After-hours Losers 1.40% 2.42% 2.57% 
 
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return 
 AR intl - AR 
sector 
AR intl - AR 
broad 
AR sector - AR 
broad 
Normal-hours Winners -1.05% -1.14% -0.13% 
 ( -3.14)*** ( -3.30)*** ( -1.09) 
Normal-hours Losers 0.23% 0.40% 0.28% 
 ( 1.23) ( 2.02)** ( 0.98) 
After-hours Winners 1.35% 1.19% -0.09% 
 ( 4.76)*** ( 4.36)*** ( -0.58) 
After-hours Losers -1.32% -1.20% 0.24% 
 ( -4.69)*** ( -3.51)*** ( 0.49) 
. *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
The differences of mean abnormal return following a trigger between ETF types show 
that for normal-hours periods, international and broad-based ETF experience higher 
differences with significance at the 1% level in case of winners, and at the 5% level in case of 
losers. On the other hand, the highest difference during after-hours period is experienced by 
international and sector ETF with significance at the 1% level. 
A more detail description and results for financial crisis abnormal return estimation by 
ETF type is presented on annex III. 
b) Overreaction on recovery period 
 Regarding recovery period estimation, the results for full sample estimation are 
presented on table 15. 
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Table 15 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers during recovery period 
 
   24 Hours 
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
Period 
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period 
 
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period1-
2) 
Panel A. Normal-hours 
Winners 
Trigger=>5% 7.17% 0.07% -0.54% -0.47% 0.93% -6.58% 
(N = 3952 ) ( 54.13)*** ( 1.03) ( -7.67)*** ( -4.66)***   
 100%;0% 51%:49% 47%:53%    
Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -6.90% 0.20% 0.84% 1.05% -2.96% -15.18% 
(N = 4567 ) ( -48.47)*** ( 2.73)*** ( 9.24)*** ( 8.62)***   
 0%;100% 55%:45% 57%:43%    
 
Panel B. After-hours 
Winners 
Trigger=>5% 6.96% -0.74% -0.30% -1.04% -10.62% -14.89% 
(N = 3040 ) ( 46.18)*** ( -6.88)*** ( -4.23)*** ( -8.22)***   
 100%;0% 49%:51% 42%:58%  
  
Losers  
     
Trigger<=-5% -7.03% 0.35% 0.46% 0.82% -5.03% -11.59% 
(N = 2710 ) ( -38.09)*** ( 3.46)*** ( 3.40)*** ( 5.04)***   
 0%;100% 51%:49% 59%:41%  
  
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
As shown on table 15, normal-hours extreme price movements experience greater level 
of overreaction than financial crisis period regardless the sign of movement. Unlike financial 
crisis period, we observe a slightly correction on period 1 for losers with significance at the 
5% level, while in case of winners we continue to observe no mean reversion on period 1. 
After-hours extreme abnormal returns show a lower level of mean reversion during 
recovery period than during financial crisis. The size of reversion on the following period is 
equal to 10.62% for winners and 5.03% for losers.  
Unlike financial crisis period, the differences of mean reversals following normal-hours 
and after-hours extreme price movements are reduced as shown on table 16. 
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Table 16 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns during recovery period 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following  
Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic Normal-hours 
Trigger 
After-hours Trigger 
5% winner 0.07% -0.74% 0.81% ( -0.15) 
5% loser 0.20% 0.35% -0.15% ( -8.73)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance 
From the analysis by types of ETF we can conclude, like in financial crisis period, only 
international ETF winners experience negative mean abnormal return after normal-hours 
periods extreme price fluctuations, as presented on table 17. 
Table 17 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns between ETF types during 
recovery period 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
 International 
ETF 
Sector ETF Broad-Based ETF 
Normal-hours Winners -0.07% 0.13% 0.04% 
Normal-hours Losers 0.30% 0.27% 0.04% 
After-hours Winners -0.60% -1.37% 0.04% 
After-hours Losers 0.06% 1.23% -0.34% 
   
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return   
 AR intl - AR 
sector 
AR intl - 
AR broad 
AR sector - AR 
broad 
Normal-hours Winners -0.51% -0.13% 0.12% 
 ( -0.74) ( 0.19) ( -1.70)* 
Normal-hours Losers -0.69% -0.23% 0.86% 
 ( -1.57) ( -0.19) ( 2.31)** 
After-hours Winners 0.70% -1.13% -1.50% 
 ( 4.39)*** ( -4.52)*** ( -6.91)*** 
After-hours Losers -0.96% 0.82% 2.00% 
 ( -2.62)*** ( 3.66)*** ( 5.64)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using 
a 2-tailed test for significance. 
During after-hours period, sector ETF shows higher degree of overreaction than others, 
which is in line with our expectations since it is characterized by low diversification level 
among all three types.  
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During normal-hours period we only observe significant differences between sector and 
broad-based ETF regardless the movement sign. These two ETF types also show the greatest 
difference on after-hours triggers with significance at the 1% level. Overall, differences 
between the three types of ETF are higher during after-hours periods. More detail results of 
abnormal returns estimation during recovery period by ETF type could be found in annex III. 
From the overreaction analysis during and after financial crisis periods, we can conclude 
some relevant differences between both periods. The figure 1 presents the mean reversals 
following two periods after triggers occur by years where it is possible to observe greater 
degree of overreaction during financial crisis years, corroborating our previous results.  
Figure 1 - Equity mean reversion in the 2 periods following extreme price movements by 
years 
 
During financial crisis period there is a clear difference between normal-hours and after-
hours extreme price movements. Normal-hours extreme abnormal returns results show a slight 
mean reversion only on period 2 while after-hours triggers present a more pronounce response 
with a size of mean reversion of more than 30% following 24 hours of triggers occur, for both 
winners and losers. During recovery period, the differences between normal-hours and after-
hours triggers are low. Comparing to financial crisis period, normal-hours triggers show higher 
degree of overreaction while after-hours extreme price movements experience a lower degree 
of overreaction.   
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Table 18 presents the differences between financial crisis and recovery period. On that 
is possible to observe higher differences in case of after-hours triggers. The difference between 
after-hours losers is significance at the 1% level. 
Table 18 - Test of differences of equity mean reversions between financial crisis and 
recovery period 
 Normal-hours After-hours 
Winners 0.35% -1.74% 
 ( -0.36) ( 0.58) 
Losers -0.37% 1.80% 
 ( 1.18) ( -2.72)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 
2-tailed test for significance. 
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4.1.5. Overreaction and market sentiment 
In this sub-chapter is presented the results for abnormal returns estimation during bull 
and bear market periods. These periods may present different investors risk appetites, while 
investors during bull market periods tend to be more optimistic about the market evolution 
and, consequently they tend to assume a risk on position, during bear market periods investors 
tend to be more pessimist assuming lower risk positions. For this estimation is only considered 
a trigger of 5%. 
Dividing our sample between bull and bear market periods we obtain a much larger 
sample on bear market periods, about 93%. It may suggest that bear market periods are more 
favourable to extreme price movements. A more complete description of our sample 
distinguished between bull and bear periods could be found on annex I. 
 
a) Overreaction on bull market periods 
The results for bull market period are shown on table 19. 
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Table 19 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers during bull market periods 
    24 Hours Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following Period  
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period  
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A. Normal-hours 
Winners 
Trigger=>5% 6.73% 0.01% -0.39% -0.38% 0.22% -5.61% 
(N = 1253 ) ( 34.87)*** ( -0.67) ( -4.85)*** ( -4.04)*** 
  
 100%;0% 51%:49% 45%:55% 
   
Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -6.51% 0.23% 0.49% 0.55% -3.48% -8.52% 
(N = 1405 ) ( -32.51)*** ( 1.73)* ( 5.17)*** ( 3.71)*** 
  
 0%;100% 53%:47% 56%:44% 
   
       
Panel B. After-hours 
Winners       
Trigger=>5% 6.72% -0.33% -0.18% -0.52% -4.98% -7.71% 
(N = 1085 ) ( 32.42)*** ( -4.15)*** ( -2.37)** ( -4.82)***   
 100%;0% 53%:47% 45%:55%  
  
Losers       
Trigger<=-5% -7.06% 0.54% 0.20% 0.74% -7.68% -10.54% 
(N = 1148 ) ( -31.98)*** ( 4.84)*** ( 1.65)* ( 4.82)***   
 0%;100% 51%:49% 56%:44%  
  
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance 
Regarding normal-hours extreme abnormal returns we observe that the degree of 
overreaction on the following two periods is similar to our full sample analysis results, with 
winners reverting, on average, 5.61% of extreme mean abnormal return experienced and losers 
reverting 8.52%, both with significance at the 1% level. 
The results for after-hours extreme abnormal returns estimation could be consulted on 
panel B. In this case, winners present a significant mean reversion equals to 5% on the period 
1 and 7.71% combined the two following periods. Losers show a slightly higher level of 
proportion reverted with, on average, 7.68% on the following period and 10.54% on the two 
following periods. Differences between mean abnormal return following normal-hours and 
after-hours triggers are small and not statistically significant in both cases winners and losers. 
The results are shown on table 20. 
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Table 20 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns during bull market periods 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following 
Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic Normal-hours 
Trigger 
After-hours 
Trigger 
5% winner 0.01% -0.33% 0.35% ( -0.25) 
5% loser 0.23% 0.54% -0.32% ( 1.39) 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-
tailed test for significance. 
Regarding ETF types, a summary of mean abnormal returns on period 1 and mean 
differences between the three ETF types are reported on table 21. 
Table 21 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns between different ETF types 
during bull market periods 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
 
International 
ETF 
Sector ETF 
Broad-Based 
ETF 
Normal-hours Winners -0.35% 0.17% 0.03% 
Normal-hours Losers 0.25% 0.08% -0.12% 
After-hours Winners 0.06% -0.92% -0.43% 
After-hours Losers 0.14% 1.21% 0.68% 
    
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return   
 
AR intl - AR 
sector 
AR intl - AR 
broad 
AR sector - AR 
broad 
Normal-hours Winners -1.33% -0.44% 0.45% 
 
( -3.34)*** ( -1.24) ( 1.14) 
Normal-hours Losers 0.53% 0.04% -0.22% 
 ( 1.80)* ( 0.07) ( -1.16) 
After-hours Winners 1.08% 0.65% -0.36% 
 ( 3.22)*** ( 1.70)* ( -1.41) 
After-hours Losers -0.83% -0.16% 0.58% 
 ( -2.09)** ( -0.48) ( 1.35) 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
As full sample analysis, international ETF presents the greatest degree of overreaction 
during normal-hours period, with significance at the 1% level. Also in case of after-hours 
extreme price movements, sector ETF experience the highest level of overreaction, while 
international experience the lowest level.  
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The differences between ETF types are shown on panel B. In this case we observe 
significant differences between international and sector ETF regardless the sign and the period 
of extreme price movement. Also, after-hours winners show a significant difference between 
international and broad-based ETF. As already pointed out, the incorporation of relevant 
information on international ETF price may be delayed due differences of time zones, with 
investors taking advantages of that. On the other hand, sector ETF are the lowest diversified 
type, thus more susceptible to mispricing. A more detail estimation of abnormal return by ETF 
type could be found on annex II. 
b) Overreaction on bear market periods 
In respect to bear market periods, for normal-hours extreme price movements the results, 
which are presented on table 22, are similar to bull market periods. The size of mean reversals 
is about 4% and 8.43% for winners and losers, respectively, following 24 hours the trigger. 
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Table 22 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers during bear market periods 
 
   24 Hours Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
Period  
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period  
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A. Normal-hours 
Winners 
Trigger=>5% 7.81% 0.32% -0.63% -0.31% 4.12% -3.99% 
(N = 8836 ) ( 89.31)*** ( 6.21)*** ( -14.39)*** ( -5.56)***   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 48%:52%  
  
Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -7.59% -0.05% 0.69% 0.64% 0.62% -8.43% 
(N = 11102 ) ( -89.29)*** ( -0.31) ( 11.44)*** ( 7.91)***   
 0%;100% 52%:48% 58%:42%  
  
       
Panel B. After-hours 
     Winners     
  
Trigger=>5% 7.64% -1.99% -0.05% -2.04% -26.00% -26.64% 
(N = 5936 ) ( 71.71)*** ( -28.21)*** ( -2.87)*** ( -23.29)***   
 100%;0% 18%:82% 20%:80%    
     Losers     
  
Trigger<=-5% -7.63% 1.60% 0.49% 2.09% -21.03% -27.46% 
(N = 5297 ) ( -61.99)*** ( 22.29)*** ( 5.07)*** ( 20.40)***   
 0%;100% 61%:39% 54%:46%    
Proportion of positive observations : proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
However, results from after-hours extreme price movements show that 82% winners 
experience significant extreme negative abnormal return on period 1, while 61% of losers 
show significant positive abnormal returns on the following period. Unlike bull market 
periods, the size of mean reversal after the two periods is more than 26% for both losers and 
winners.  
The following table 23 reports the differences between normal-hours and after-hours 
mean abnormal return on period 1.  
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Table 23 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns during bear market periods 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following  
Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic Normal-hours 
Trigger 
After-hours Trigger 
5% winner 0.32% -1.99% 2.31% ( -1.23) 
5% loser -0.05% 1.60% -1.65% ( -65.37)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
Unlike bull market periods, on bear market periods we obtain significant mean 
difference equals to -1.65% in case of losers. For winners, the mean difference is 2.31%, 
however it is not statistically significant.  
A summary of estimation results by ETF type are shown on table 24. 
Table 24 - Test of differences in equity mean abnormal returns between ETF types during 
bear market periods 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
  
International 
ETF 
Sector ETF Broad-Based ETF 
Normal-hours Winners -0.02% 0.34% 0.46% 
Normal-hours Losers 0.22% 0.04% -0.32% 
After-hours Winners -1.19% -2.57% -1.97% 
After-hours Losers 0.97% 2.08% 1.64% 
    
    
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return   
  
AR intl - AR 
sector 
AR intl - 
AR broad 
AR sector - AR 
broad 
Normal-hours Winners -0.77% -0.93% -0.11% 
 ( -2.20)** ( -3.17)*** ( -1.35) 
Normal-hours Losers -0.10% 0.16% 0.43% 
 ( 0.51) ( 1.49) ( 2.00)** 
After-hours Winners 1.14% 0.38% -0.65% 
 ( 5.81)*** ( 2.32)** ( -3.31)*** 
After-hours Losers -1.29% -0.37% 0.85% 
 ( -5.03)*** ( -0.91) ( 3.58)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using 
a 2-tailed test for significance. 
In this case, we achieve the same conclusions that bull market periods, with international 
ETF experiencing the greatest degree of overreaction during normal-hours periods. In case of 
after-hours extreme price movements, sector ETF experience the highest proportion of 
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reversal 24 hours after triggers occur. Nevertheless, and in line with previous conclusions, 
bear market periods show a more pronounced degree of overreaction in all three ETF type 
regardless the time and the sign of trigger. The only exception is broad-based normal-hours 
triggers which present a slightly lower mean reversal on bear market periods. The differences 
of abnormal return between the three type show significant differences between all types, 
being more pronounced between international and sector ETF after-hours triggers.  A more 
detail results of estimation by ETF type could be found on annex I. 
Overall, the analysis between bear and bull market periods suggests a more pronounced 
degree of overreaction during bear market periods, mainly following after-hours extreme 
abnormal returns. Additionally, unlike bear market periods, we do not find significant mean 
abnormal returns differences between normal-hours and after-hours triggers during bull 
market period. 
By ETF type, we conclude that in both periods the greatest mean difference occurs 
between international ETF and sector ETF. Nevertheless, during bull market period we do not 
find significant differences with other types, while during bear market periods there are 
significant abnormal returns differences following extreme price movements in almost all 
periods and between the three ETF types. Regarding the abnormal returns differences between 
both periods we observe higher differences during after-hours periods in both winners and 
losers. These differences are significant at the 1% level, as reported on table 25. 
Table 25 - Test of differences in equity mean reversions between bull and bear market 
periods 
 Normal-hours After-hours 
Winners -0.31% 1.65% 
 ( -0.77) ( 3.97)*** 
Losers 0.27% -1.06% 
 ( 1.63) ( 6.42)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 
2-tailed test for significance. 
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4.2 Overreaction on ETF Fixed Income Market 
4.2.1. Overreaction during normal-hours and after-hours period 
As already mentioned, ETF fixed income market is a recent market which have been 
faced a huge development over the last decade. This study focuses on US market, the most 
developed and liquid ETF market. Yet, this market is not as developed as ETF equity market, 
so there is a limited range of instruments available during the analysis period.  
As far as we know there are no other studies approaching overreaction on ETF fixed 
income market, so this study intends to be a first contribute for this theme. 
Like in equity market analysis, we divide our sample in sub-periods, namely, financial 
crisis and recovery periods as well as bull and bear market periods. The present analysis 
focuses on international and broad-based ETF types, since there are no sector fixed income 
ETF during the analysis period.   
Firstly, the table 26 presents the estimation results for abnormal returns following 
normal-hours extreme price fluctuations.  
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Table 26 - Full sample abnormal returns following normal-hours fixed income triggers 
 
Normal-
hours 
After-
hours 
Normal-
hours 
24Hours 
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 
Period  
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period1
-2) 
Panel A. Winners 
Trigger=>5% 7.65% 0.70% -0.48% 0.23% 9.19% 2.96% 
(N = 125 ) (12.02)*** (1.70)* (-1.48) (0.30) 
  
 100%:0% 51%:49% 48%:52% 
   
Trigger=>6% 8.88% 0.92% -0.68% 0.24% 10.31% 2.70% 
(N = 78 ) (10.88)*** (1.76)* (-1.61) (0.25) 
  
 100%:0% 53%:47% 47%:53% 
   
Trigger=>7% 9.85% 1.23% -0.74% 0.49% 12.50% 4.94% 
(N = 53 ) (9.86)*** (1.95)* (-1.45) (0.50) 
  
 100%:0% 60%:40% 45%:55% 
   
       
Panel B. Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -7.40% 0.46% 0.25% 0.71% -6.24% -9.59% 
(N = 234 ) (-12.75)*** (1.52) (0.73) (1.61) 
  
 0%:100% 59%:41% 53%:47% 
   
Trigger<=-6% -8.55% 0.49% 0.32% 0.82% -5.78% -9.55% 
(N = 155 ) (-12.19)*** (1.33) (0.82) (1.53) 
  
 0%:100% 63%:37% 54%:46% 
   
Trigger<=-7% -9.68% 0.44% 0.63% 1.07% -4.55% -11.07% 
(N = 104 ) (-11.46)*** (0.97) (1.46) (1.68)* 
  
 0%:100% 63%:37% 55%:45% 
   
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
Through the results presented we conclude that winners, on average, do not experience 
any correction in the following two periods. For a 5% trigger, 51% of winners experience 
abnormal positive returns on period 1 while 60% of losers experience positive abnormal return 
on the same period. Notwithstanding, in case of losers, we observe a small size of reversals 
equals to 6.24%, 5.78% and 4.55% for a trigger of 5%, 6% and 7%, respectively.  
Like equity market, also fixed income market after-hours triggers present a very 
different behaviour from normal-hours extreme price movements. The results for after-hours 
extreme price movements are shown on table 27.  
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Table 27 - Full sample abnormal returns following after-hours fixed income triggers 
 
After-
hours 
Normal-
hours 
After-
hours 
24 Hours 
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
Period  
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period1-
2) 
Panel A. Winners 
Trigger=>5% 7.34% -2.44% 0.09% -2.35% -33.28% -32.04% 
(N = 130 ) (11.81)*** (-6.11)*** (0.10) (-4.49)*** 
  
 100%:0% 32%:68% 50%:50% 
   
Trigger=>6% 8.32% -3.05% -0.08% -3.12% -36.63% -37.57% 
(N = 88 ) (10.89)*** (-6.27)*** (-0.31) (-4.88)*** 
  
 100%:0% 27%:73% 47%:53% 
   
Trigger=>7% 9.26% -3.57% 0.25% -3.31% -38.49% -35.78% 
(N = 59 ) (9.84)*** (-6.01)*** (0.37) (-4.23)*** 
  
 100%:0% 25%:75% 47%:53% 
   
       
Panel B. Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -7.11% 1.35% 0.25% 1.60% -19.00% -22.47% 
(N = 93 ) (-7.68)*** (2.84)*** (0.45) (2.41)** 
  
 0%:100% 58%:42% 58%:42% 
   
Trigger<=-6% -8.50% 2.14% 0.11% 2.26% -25.23% -26.56% 
(N = 50 ) (-6.88)*** (3.31)*** (0.10) (2.53)** 
  
 0%:100% 64%:36% 54%:46% 
   
Trigger<=-7% -9.31% 2.14% 0.83% 2.97% -23.00% -31.90% 
(N = 34 ) (-6.28)*** (2.73)*** (1.12) (2.77)*** 
  
 0%:100% 62%:38% 56%:44% 
   
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
The results show that, for a trigger of 5%, 68% of after-hours winners experience a 
negative significant abnormal return on period 1 with a mean abnormal return equals to -2.44% 
and significance at the 1% level. For a trigger of 7%, we conclude a mean abnormal return 
equals to -3.75% and significance at the 1% level with 75% of winners experiencing negative 
abnormal return on period 1. Unlike normal-hours period, the size of mean reversions 
increases with the trigger consider and it is equal to 33.28%, 36.63% and 38.49% for a 5%, 
6% and 7% trigger, respectively. Also in case of losers, the level of overreaction is greater 
than during normal-hours periods. Notwithstanding, it is slightly lower than observed for 
winners. For a trigger of 5%, the proportion of overreaction reversed in the following period 
46 
 
is about 19%, while for a trigger of 6% and 7%, it is equals to 25.23% and 23%, respectively. 
Stress that all these results are significant at the 1% level. The differences between normal-
hours and after-hours mean abnormal return on period 1 are presented on table 28. 
Table 28 -Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic 
Normal-hours Trigger After-hours Trigger 
5% winner 0.70% -2.44% 3.14% (6.22)*** 
6% winner 0.92% -3.05% 3.96% (5.61)*** 
7% winner 1.23% -3.57% 4.80% (5.13)*** 
5% loser 0.46% 1.35% -0.89% (1.88)* 
6% loser 0.49% 2.14% -1.65% (1.57) 
7% loser 0.44% 2.14% -1.70% (1.47) 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed 
test for significance. 
Overall, the greatest difference is observed among winners cases, with a mean difference 
equals to 3.14%, 3.96% and 4.80% for a trigger of 5%, 6% and 7%, respectively. These 
differences are significant at the 1% level. In respect to losers, we observe smaller differences 
and only in case of 5% trigger we observe statistically significance at the 10% level. In this 
case, the difference between mean abnormal returns is equal to -0.89%. 
4.2.2. Overreaction in different ETF Types 
Regarding our analysis by ETF types, the results are presented on table 29. Stress that, 
for this analysis, we consider only 5% trigger. 
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Table 29 - Abnormal returns following fixed income triggers by ETF types 
        
24 Hours 
Proportion of 
the Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 
Period  
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours    
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period1-
2) 
Panel A - Normal Hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 8.27% 1.03% -0.93% 0.10% 12.45% 1.15% 
(N = 33 ) (6.63)*** (1.29) (-1.42) (0.03)   
 100%:0% 55%:45% 45%:55%    
Broad Based ETF 7.42% 0.58% -0.31% 0.27% 7.88% 3.68% 
(N = 92 ) (10.04)*** (1.21) (-0.88) (0.33)   
 100%:0% 50%:50% 49%:51%    
    Losers       
International ETF -7.75% 0.85% 0.66% 1.51% -10.96% -19.52% 
(N = 69 ) (-7.30)*** (1.53) (1.25) (1.96)**   
 0%;100% 64%:36% 61%:39%    
Broad Based ETF -7.25% 0.30% 0.07% 0.37% -4.13% -5.15% 
(N = 165 ) (-10.46)*** (0.82) (0.05) (0.65)   
 0%;100% 58%:42% 50%:50%    
       
Panel B - After Hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 7.96% -3.45% -0.15% -3.60% -43.30% -45.23% 
(N = 48 ) (7.73)*** (-5.24)*** (-0.36) (-4.14)***   
 100%:0% 25%:75% 52%:48%    
Broad Based ETF 6.97% -1.85% 0.23% -1.62% -26.57% -23.22% 
(N = 82 ) (8.96)*** (-3.69)*** (0.40) (-2.48)**   
 100%:0% 35%:65% 49%:51%    
    Losers       
International ETF -7.58% 1.84% 0.45% 2.29% -24.30% -30.19% 
(N = 24 ) (-4.20)*** (1.97)** (0.47) (1.78)*   
 0%;100% 75%:25% 71%:29%    
Broad Based ETF -6.94% 1.18% 0.18% 1.36% -16.99% -19.53% 
(N = 69 ) (-6.44)*** (2.13)** (0.25) (1.75)*   
 0%;100% 52%:48% 54%:46%    
Proportion of positive observations : proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
The results show that regardless the period of the day that trigger occurs, international 
ETF experience higher degree of overreaction than broad-based ETF. However, it is important 
to notice that the low number of observations for international ETF could influence the results 
48 
 
obtained. Additionally, none of types experience a mean reversion following a normal-hours 
winner trigger. 
The differences of mean abnormal returns on period 1 between both types could be found 
on table 30. It allows us to conclude that only normal-hours losers mean difference is 
significant at the 10% level. Notwithstanding, the greatest difference are observed between 
after-hours extreme price movements.   
Table 30  -Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns between different ETF 
types 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
 International 
ETF 
Broad-Based 
ETF 
 
Normal-hours Winners 1.03% 0.58%  
Normal-hours Losers 0.85% 0.30%  
After-hours Winners -3.45% -1.85%  
After-hours Losers 1.84% 1.18%  
    
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return   
 AR intl - AR 
Broad-Based 
  
Normal-hours Winners 0.45%   
 ( 0.69 )   
Normal-hours Losers 0.55%   
 ( 1.73 )*   
After-hours Winners -1.60%   
 ( -1.11 )   
After-hours Losers 0.66%   
 ( 0.74 )   
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 
2-tailed test for significance. 
4.2.3 The multivariate analysis 
The results from multivariate model applied for fixed income market are shown on table 
31. As we did for equity market, also in this case we run a multivariate model for normal-
hours and after-hours observations as well as for winners and losers triggers. 
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Table 31 - Multivariate model for fixed income ETF3 
 
Overall 
Model 
Normal-
hours 
After-
hours 
Winner Loser 
AFTERHOURS -0.010**   -0.030*** 0.009* 
 (0.028) 
  (0.000) (0.093) 
LOSDUM -0.004 0.009 -0.044   
 (0.729) (0.396) (0.107) 
  
TRIGGER -0.123 0.082 -0.566*** -0.356** -0.047 
 (0.176) (0.258) (0.003) (0.039) (0.507) 
INTLDUM -0.003 0.004 -0.008 -0.009 0.006 
 (0.555) (0.485) (0.314) (0.300) (0.220) 
CORPDUM 0.006 0.005 0.013 0.020** 0.000 
 (0.185) (0.295) (0.149) (0.017) (0.941) 
BULLDUM -0.009 -0.004 -0.015 -0.014 0.000 
 (0.107) (0.552) (0.149) (0.215) (0.985) 
TAXDUM -0.008* -0.007 -0.011 -0.022*** -0.004 
 (0.087) (0.210) (0.207) (0.004) (0.550) 
ABN_VOLUME -0.000 -0.000* -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.438) (0.089) (0.045) (0.399) (0.114) 
ABN_VOLATILITY 0.272 0.117 0.850 1.079** -0.245 
 (0.342) (0.686) (0.112) (0.031) (0.443) 
Year08 -0.016 -0.013 0.001 -0.043*** -0.009 
 (0.118) (0.169) (0.953) (0.004) (0.451) 
Year09 -0.024** -0.017** -0.011 -0.055*** -0.014 
 (0.012) (0.042) (0.433) (0.000) (0.169) 
Year10 -0.027** -0.021** -0.011 -0.068*** -0.011 
 (0.016) (0.031) (0.403) (0.000) (0.323) 
Year11 -0.019* -0.020** 0.000 -0.040*** -0.022** 
 (0.057) (0.040) (0.982) (0.006) (0.042) 
Year12 -0.011 -0.011 0.010 -0.030** -0.010 
 (0.290) (0.279) (0.375) (0.041) (0.357) 
Year13 -0.019* -0.018  -0.032 -0.023* 
 (0.092) (0.113) 
 (0.103) (0.085) 
Year14 -0.008 -0.021** 0.044* -0.038** 0.004 
 (0.583) (0.030) (0.056) (0.019) (0.802) 
Constant 0.027** 0.016 0.021 0.076*** 0.014 
 (0.044) (0.183) (0.248) (0.004) (0.305) 
      
Observations 582 359 223 255 327 
Adj r-squared 0.062 0.004 0.221 0.184 -0.001 
F 3.356 1.369 6.549 22.13 1.123 
Prob>F 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.33 
                                                          
3The dependent variable is the abnormal return following extreme price movements. Dummy variable 
AFTERHOURS equals one if the trigger occurs on after-hours period and zero otherwise. LOSDUM assumes 
one on losers observations and zero otherwise. TRIGGER variable measure the extreme price fluctuations 
observed.  INTLDUM assumes value of one in case of international ETF and zero otherwise while CORPDUM 
is one if ETF are composed by corporate bonds and zero otherwise. The variable ABN_VOLUME corresponds 
to the abnormal volume traded on trigger day measured by the difference between volume on trigger day and the 
mean of volume traded over the last 255 days ending 15 prior the trigger. Based on the same methodology is 
computed ABN_VOLATILITY variable which refers to the abnormal standard deviation of returns observed 
over the past ninety days before trigger. The dummy variable BULLDUM assumes value of one if extreme price 
movement occurs during a bull market period and zero otherwise. TAXDUM takes the value of one if trigger 
occurs during December or January months and 0 otherwise. YEAR09 assumes value of one if the trigger occurs 
during 2009 and zero otherwise. The same is true for dummies variables: YEAR10, YEAR11, YEAR12, 
YEAR13 and YEAR14. See chapter 3 for details. 
Robust pval in parentheses. *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Regarding normal-hours model, the dependent variable shows a significant sensibility 
to abnormal volume on the trigger day with significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, 
after-hours model shows significance of TRIGGER and ABN_VOLUME variables at the 1% 
level. In this case, the TRIGGER coefficient equals to -0.566 suggests that 56.6% of the 
reversal on period 1 is preceded by the extreme price movement, ceteris paribus.  
In case of winners’ model, we observe a negative AFTERHOURS dummy variable with 
significance at the 1% level suggesting a more pronounce response in case of after-hours 
winners than normal-hours winners. Additionally, 35.6% of abnormal return on period 1 is 
explained by the positive extreme price movement, ceteris paribus, with significance at the 
5% level. Losers model also shows significance at AFTERHOURS dummy variable, with 10% 
level of significance. 
Stress that normal-hours and losers multivariate models are not overall significant. It 
could suggest that this market presents a higher level of efficiency during normal-hours 
periods. Thus, we are not able to predict the abnormal return. However, it could also means 
that the behaviour of noise traders randomly impact on the market, so abnormal returns that 
arise from their activity affect all ETF market, being not possible to predict by analysing to 
different variables. 
Then, we compute a multivariate model for each type of ETF and the results are shown 
on table 32. 
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Table 32 -Multivariate model for fixed income ETF divided by type4 
 Panel A. International ETF Panel B. Broad-Based ETF 
 
Normal-
hours 
After-
hours 
Winners Losers 
Normal-
hours 
After-hours Winners Losers 
AFTERHOURS   -0.040*** 0.012   -0.023*** 0.009 
 
  (0.008) (0.349)   (0.001) (0.181) 
LOSDUM -0.003 0.010   0.015 -0.086**   
 (0.917) (0.759) 
  (0.187) (0.011)   
TRIGGER -0.008 -0.228 -0.314 0.057 0.122* -0.837*** -0.265 -0.087 
 (0.967) (0.291) (0.154) (0.696) (0.097) (0.001) (0.275) (0.298) 
CORPDUM 0.004 0.028* 0.045*** -0.007 0.008 0.014 0.015 0.007 
 (0.724) (0.059) (0.006) (0.451) (0.121) (0.252) (0.129) (0.285) 
BULLDUM 0.004 -0.008 -0.001 0.004 -0.008 -0.021* -0.020 -0.002 
 (0.780) (0.675) (0.956) (0.729) (0.253) (0.093) (0.133) (0.747) 
TAXDUM -0.008 -0.012 -0.015 -0.011 -0.006 -0.013 -0.027*** 0.001 
 (0.323) (0.350) (0.152) (0.306) (0.414) (0.304) (0.005) (0.906) 
ABN_VOLUME -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.337) (0.002) (0.275) (0.300) (0.921) (0.487) (0.929) (0.163) 
ABN_VOLATILITY 0.160 1.855** 1.276* 0.280 -0.080 -0.200 0.654 -0.954** 
 (0.713) (0.031) (0.087) (0.612) (0.850) (0.810) (0.400) (0.033) 
Year08 0.004 0.007 0.044* 0.007 -0.020 -0.052* -0.058*** -0.013 
 (0.764) (0.774) (0.050) (0.616) (0.115) (0.069) (0.002) (0.391) 
Year09 -0.005 -0.009 0.010 0.007 -0.021* -0.057** -0.052*** -0.018 
 (0.709) (0.620) (0.621) (0.557) (0.058) (0.045) (0.001) (0.174) 
Year10 -0.003   0.005 -0.026** -0.069** -0.082*** -0.019 
 (0.779) 
  (0.561) (0.036) (0.012) (0.000) (0.193) 
Year11 -0.023   0.006 -0.019 -0.045* -0.045** -0.022 
 (0.169) 
  (0.644) (0.120) (0.084) (0.017) (0.138) 
Year12 -0.004 0.036*** 0.065*** 0.002 -0.012 -0.055** -0.046*** -0.016 
 (0.701) (0.009) (0.005) (0.828) (0.389) (0.042) (0.009) (0.308) 
Year13 
-0.013 0.039 0.083*** 
-
0.038** 
-0.023 -0.063** -0.059** -0.024 
 (0.442) (0.118) (0.002) (0.012) (0.112) (0.030) (0.016) (0.154) 
Year14     -0.022*  -0.051*** 0.003 
 
    (0.084)  (0.004) (0.889) 
Constant 0.007 -0.047 -0.036 0.006 0.019 0.103*** 0.086** 0.017 
 (0.818) (0.104) (0.350) (0.641) (0.194) (0.006) (0.015) (0.327) 
         
Observations 83 54 58 79 217 117 136 198 
Adj r-squared -0.117 0.306 0.233 -0.101 0.004 0.185 0.136 0.011 
F 6.42 8.324 4.426 84.29 1.397 3.258 16.4 1.241 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.25 
                                                          
4The dependent variable is the abnormal return following extreme price movements. Dummy variable 
AFTERHOURS equals one if the trigger occurs on after-hours period and zero otherwise. LOSDUM assumes 
one on losers observations and zero otherwise. TRIGGER variable measure the extreme price fluctuations 
observed.  INTLDUM assumes value of one in case of international ETF and zero otherwise while CORPDUM 
is one if ETF is composed by corporate bonds and zero otherwise. The variable ABN_VOLUME corresponds to 
the abnormal volume traded on trigger day measured by the difference between volume on trigger day and the 
mean of volume traded over the last 255 days ending 15 prior the trigger. Based on the same methodology is 
computed ABN_VOLATILITY variable which refers to the abnormal standard deviation of returns observed 
over the past ninety days before trigger. The dummy variable BULLDUM assumes value of one if extreme price 
movement occurs during a bull market period and zero otherwise. TAXDUM takes the value of one if trigger 
occurs during December or January months and 0 otherwise. YEAR09 assumes value of one if the trigger occurs 
during 2009 and zero otherwise. The same is true for dummies variables: YEAR10, YEAR11, YEAR12, 
YEAR13 and YEAR14. See chapter 3 for details. 
Robust pval in parentheses. *, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Stress that in some ETF type models, dummies variables covering different years do not 
present any value since there are no observations for such specific year. 
In case of international ETF, all models shows no significance of TRIGGER variable. 
The after-hours model shows sensibility of dependent variable to abnormal volume and 
abnormal volatility. It also shows a positive CORPDUM variable with significance at the 10% 
level. In case of winners’ model, AFTERHOURS and CORPDUM dummy variables have a 
significant influence on the level of overreaction. All models for international ETF are overall 
significant at the 1% level.  
Regarding broad-based ETF normal-hours model, it shows a significant TRIGGER 
coefficient equals to 0.122. In case of after-hours model, we observe a TRIGGER coefficient 
equals to -0.837, which suggest that 83.7% of reversal could be explained by size of extreme 
price movements occurred during after-hours period, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, 
winners model shows a negative significant AFTERHOURS dummy variable indicating 
greater degree of overreaction following an after-hours trigger. Such result corroborates the 
findings of previous estimation. However, for this type of ETF, normal-hours and losers 
models are not overall significant. 
Overall, like in equity market, we conclude a lower degree of overreaction on normal-
hours than after-hours triggers in ETF fixed income market. In normal-hours periods, winners 
do not experience mean reversion in the two period following extreme price movements. In 
case of losers, we conclude a size of mean reversal of about 10% for the same period. The 
scenario is different for after-hours extreme abnormal returns. In this case, we observe 
significant reversals in both winners and losers, being more pronounced on winners.  
The analysis by ETF types suggests greater degree of overreaction in case of 
international ETF which meets our expectations since broad-based ETF have the more 
diversified underlying.  
From multivariate models analysis, we conclude that the degree of overreaction is 
sensible to the magnitude of extreme movements (trigger). Moreover, the period of day when 
occur the extreme price movements also have a significant impact on the size of response to 
them, in case of winners.  
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4.2.4. Overreaction and Financial Crisis 
In this sub-chapter, we analyse the patterns of overreaction observed on US fixed income 
ETF market during financial crisis. For that, as previous mentioned, we divide our analysis 
into financial crisis and recovery periods. Like on equity market, we use the periods defined 
by Madura et al. (2009). According to authors, financial crisis began on October 9th, 2007 
ending on March 9th, 2009. The recovery period started at March 9th, 2009 until December 
31st, 2014. 
In this analysis was only consider a trigger of 5%. More than 99% of our full sample 
observations occurred during these two periods. A more detail description of our sample 
distributed by these two periods may be found on annex III. 
 
a) Overreaction on financial crisis period 
The results of abnormal returns estimation for financial crisis period are shown on table 
33.  
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Table 33 - Abnormal returns following fixed income triggers during financial crisis period 
    24Hours Proportion 
of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
Period  
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
24 Hours 
 
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A. Normal-hours  
 Winners  
Trigger=>5% 8.21% 1.55% -1.00% 0.55% 18.91% 6.73% 
(N = 64 ) (9.37)*** (1.49) (-1.48) (-0.01)   
 100%:0% 64%:36% 44%:56%    
Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -7.45% 0.45% -0.04% 0.41% -5.99% -5.45% 
(N = 133 ) (-9.19)*** (-0.48) (0.11) (-0.25)   
 0%:100% 59%:41% 50%:50%    
       
Panel B. After-hours 
Winners 
Trigger=>5% 7.35% -1.15% 0.61% -0.54% -15.61% -7.33% 
(N = 59 ) (8.16)*** (-2.84)*** (1.09) (-1.21) 
  
 100%:0% 34%:66% 54%:46% 
   
Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -7.41% 2.53% 0.18% 2.71% -34.09% -36.50% 
(N = 40 ) (-5.01)*** (2.44)** (0.34) (1.94)* 
  
 0%:100% 70%:30% 58%:43% 
   
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
Panel A reports the results for normal-hours triggers and they show that winners do not 
experience a mean correction on the following period, while losers experience a slightly mean 
reversion of 5.99% on period 1. However, the responses to extreme abnormal returns in both 
cases are not statistically significant. 
Unlike normal-hours, after-hours extreme price movements show significant reversals 
on winners and losers, being both significant at the 5% level. A more pronounced level of 
degree is found on negative abnormal returns.  
The mean abnormal return differences between normal-hours and after-hours periods 
are presented on table 34. 
55 
 
Table 34 - Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns during financial crisis 
period 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following  Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic 
 Normal-hours Trigger After-hours Trigger 
5% winner 1.55% -1.15% 2.70% (-0.01) 
5% loser 0.45% 2.53% -2.08% (-3.51)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
We conclude significant mean abnormal return differences following normal-hours and 
after-hours triggers, in case of losers. This difference is equal to -2.08% with significance at 
the 1% level.  
The analysis by ETF type allow us to conclude that normal-hours winners for both types 
do not experience mean correction after extreme abnormal returns, while losers show a slightly 
reversion on the following period. However, both types show, on average, greater level of 
overreaction following losers abnormal returns regardless the period of the day, as reported on 
table 35. 
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Table 35 - Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns between different ETF 
types during financial crisis period 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
 International ETF Broad-Based ETF 
Normal-hours Winners 1.26% 1.72% 
Normal-hours Losers 0.92% 0.19% 
After-hours Winners -1.73% -0.75% 
After-hours Losers 2.22% 2.73% 
   
   
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return  
 AR intl - AR 
Broad-Based 
 
Normal-hours Winners -0.46%  
 (-0.05)  
Normal-hours Losers 0.73%  
 (0.97)  
After-hours Winners -0.99%  
 (-0.39)  
After-hours Losers -0.51%  
 (-0.07)  
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
On the other hand, panel B shows no significant mean abnormal return differences 
between international and broad-based ETF in both periods. A more detail results of this 
estimation could be found on annex III. 
b) Overreaction on recovery period 
 In this sub-chapter is analysed the abnormal returns after financial crisis, known as 
recovery period. The results may be consulted on table 36. 
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Table 36 - Abnormal returns following fixed income triggers during recovery period 
    24Hours Proportion of 
the Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 
Period  
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours 
 Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period 1-
2) 
Panel A. Normal-hours 
 Winners 
Trigger=>5% 7.05% -0.19% 0.07% -0.12% -2.69% -1.64% 
(N = 61 ) (7.59)*** (0.89) (-0.37) (0.52) 
  
 100%:0% 38%:62% 52%:48%    
Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -7.35% 0.48% 0.63% 1.11% -6.50% -15.12% 
(N = 100 ) (-8.76)*** (2.76)*** (1.51) (3.10)*** 
  
 0%:100% 60%:40% 57%:43%    
       
Panel B. After-hours 
Winners 
Trigger=>5% 7.32% -3.52% -0.34% -3.86% -48.01% -52.66% 
(N = 71 ) (8.48)*** (-5.81)*** (-1.65)* (-5.68)***   
 100%:0% 30%:70% 46%:54%    
Losers 
Trigger<=-5% -6.88% 0.46% 0.30% 0.76% -6.73% -11.05% 
(N = 53 ) (-5.93)*** (1.98)** (0.23) (1.75)*   
 0%:100% 49%:51% 58%:42%    
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
 Unlike financial crisis period, recovery period estimation shows that more than 60% 
of normal-hours winners experience negative abnormal return on the following period. Even 
so, the size of mean reversal is 2.69% and it does not show statistically significance.  Losers, 
on the other hand, experience a mean reversion equals to 6.50% with significance at the 1% 
level. After-hours extreme price fluctuations show important differences comparing to 
financial crisis. As it is possible to observe on panel B, winners experience a significant 
negative mean abnormal return equals to -3.52% on period 1 which means 48.01% of the 
extreme mean abnormal return reverted in the following period. By contrast, the mean 
abnormal return experienced by losers on period 1 is equal to 0.46% which correspond to 
6.73% of the extreme mean abnormal return reverted on period 1. Both reversions are 
significant at the 5% level. 
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The mean abnormal return differences following normal-hours and after-hours triggers 
are shown on table 37. Winners show the greatest difference however it is no statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the mean difference observed between normal-hours and after-
hours losers is equal to 0.02% and significant at the 1% level.  
Table 37 - Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns during recovery 
period 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following 
Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic 
Normal-hours Trigger 
After-hours 
Trigger 
5% winner -0.19% -3.52% 3.33% (-0.87) 
5% loser 0.48% 0.46% 0.02% (-4.62)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test 
for significance. 
The analysis by ETF type allows us to conclude that both types experience greater degree 
of overreaction during after-hours period. Also, during this period we observe greater 
differences on mean abnormal returns between both types, as presented on table 38.  
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Table 38 - Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns between ETF types 
during recovery period 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% 
trigger 
  
International 
ETF 
Broad-Based 
ETF 
Normal -hours Winners 0.50% -0.32% 
Normal-hours Losers 0.69% 0.42% 
After-hours Winners -5.16% -2.67% 
After-hours Losers 0.46% 1.09% 
 
  
   
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return  
  
AR intl - AR 
Broad-Based  
Normal-hours Winners 0.82%  
 (0.66)  
Normal-hours Losers 0.27%  
 (0.43)  
After-hours Winners -2.49%  
 (-1.84)*  
After-hours Losers -0.63%  
 (0.75)  
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
A more detail results of this estimation could be found on annex III. 
Overall, we find some differences between financial crisis and recovery periods. Figure 
2 presents the mean reversion on the following two periods after extreme abnormal returns 
occur by year. We observe greater reversions in case of winners, being more pronounced 
during 2010. It is important to stress that the number of observations on 2007, 2013 and 2014 
are less than 10, so the numbers of such years are not representative of the market.  
60 
 
Figure 2 - Fixed income mean reversion in the 2 periods following extreme price 
movements by years 
           
Comparing normal-hours and after-hours periods, both periods show higher degree of 
overreaction in case of after-hours extreme price movements. However, there are some 
relevant differences. While during financial crisis, winners experience a significant mean 
reversion equals to 15% of the extreme abnormal return on period 1, during recovery period 
48% of the mean extreme positive abnormal return revert on the following period. Contrarily, 
losers show a more pronounce response after extreme price fluctuations during financial 
period. 
The table 39 presents the mean reversion differences between these two periods. 
Table 39 - Test of differences of fixed income mean reversions between financial crisis and 
recovery period 
 Normal-hours After-hours 
Winners 1.74% 2.37% 
 (-0.01) (-0.79) 
Losers -0.03% 2.06% 
 (-0.23) (0.19) 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using 
a 2-tailed test for significance. 
On that, we conclude there are no significant differences of mean reversals between 
financial crisis and recovery periods, Even so, after-hours responses to extreme abnormal 
return show greater differences than normal-hours responses. These results suggest that even 
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during such unique event, the degree of overreaction on the market is reduced during normal-
hours, however it is more pronounced during after-hours period. Nonetheless, the differences 
between the two periods analysed are not clearly, while losers show a greater response on 
financial crisis period, winners experience higher degree of overreaction during recovery 
period. 
As already pointed out, these results could be explained by the presence of higher 
proportion of uninformed investors to informed traders presented on the market during this 
period. Investors, in accordance with behavioural finance theories, tend to overweight recent 
movements of the price in detrimental of fundamental value which could explain the greater 
degree of overreaction on losers during financial crisis and winners during recovery period. 
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4.2.5. Overreaction and market sentiment 
In this sub-chapter is presented the results of abnormal returns estimation during bull 
and bear fixed income market periods. For the same reasons presented on equity market, 
different market sentiment may be characterized by different investors’ behaviours. The 
distinction between bull and bear market periods follows Pagan and Sossounov (2003) 
methodology which are described on appendix I. The distribution of our sample between both 
periods could be found on annex I. Also, for this estimation is only considers one level of 
trigger equals to 5%. 
a) Overreaction on bull market periods 
Through bull market periods analysis, we conclude that normal-hours mean abnormal 
returns on period 1 are in line with already discussed on the full sample period analysis, with 
slight reversals in case of losers. The results are shown in the following table 40. 
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Table 40 - Abnormal returns following fixed income triggers during bull market periods 
 
   24 Hours 
 
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the Following 
Period  
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A. Normal-hours 
Winners       
Trigger=>5% 7.42% 0.06% -0.22% -0.15% 0.84% -2.06% 
(N = 83 ) (9.21)*** (1.19) (-0.48) (0.56)   
 100%:0% 46%:54% 54%:46%  
  
Losers       
Trigger<=-5% -7.49% 0.38% 0.09% 0.46% -5.03% -6.18% 
(N = 149 ) (-10.50)*** (2.50)** (0.29) (2.09)**   
 0%:100% 58%:42% 50%:50%  
  
Panel B. After-hours 
Winners       
Trigger=>5% 7.33% -3.32% -0.11% -3.44% -45.34% -46.91% 
(N = 85 ) (9.21)*** (-6.16)*** (-0.25) (-4.83)***   
 100%:0% 27%:73% 53%:47%  
  
Losers       
Trigger<=-5% -7.12% 0.82% 0.24% 1.06% -11.45% -14.86% 
(N = 50 ) (-5.75)*** (2.18)** (0.44) (1.96)**   
 0%:100% 56%:44% 54%:46%  
  
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
On panel B, after-hours extreme prices fluctuation show significant mean reversion on 
period 1 highlighting winners triggers. In this case, the proportion of overreaction reversed in 
the following 24 hours after extreme price movements occur is equal to 46.91% and significant 
at the 1% level. Losers, on the other hand, experience a mean reversion equals to 14.86% in 
the following two periods.  
The mean abnormal return differences between normal-hours and after-hours triggers 
could be found on table 41. 
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Table 41 - Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns during bull market 
periods 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following  
Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic 
 Normal-hours Trigger 
After-hours 
Trigger 
5% winner 0.06% -3.32% 3.39% (-0.06) 
5% loser 0.38% 0.82% -0.44% (-4.47)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test 
for significance. 
Although the mean difference between normal-hours and after-hours triggers being 
more pronounced among winners it has not statistically significance. On the other hand, the 
mean difference of losers is equal to -0.44% and significant at the 1% level.   
The analysis by ETF types shows that international ETF experience greater response to 
extreme price fluctuations in both periods, being more expressive during after-hours period. 
However, all differences show no statistically significance, as presented on table 42. 
Table 42 - Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns between ETF types 
during bull market periods 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
 International 
ETF 
Broad-Based 
ETF 
 
Normal-hours Winners 2.57% 1.83%  
Normal-hours Losers 0.71% 0.57%  
After-hours Winners -4.24% -2.61%  
After-hours Losers 1.98% 0.63%  
    
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return 
 AR intl - AR 
Broad-Based 
  
Normal-hours Winners 0.74%   
 (1.00)   
Normal-hours Losers 0.14%   
 (0.63)   
After-hours Winners -1.63%   
 (-1.38)   
After-hours Losers 1.35%   
 (1.08)   
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
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b) Overreaction on bear market periods 
The results of bear market periods analysis are shown on table 43. 
Table 43 - Abnormal returns following fixed income triggers during bear market periods 
 
   24Hours Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 
Period 
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period  
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period1-
2) 
Panel A. Normal-hours 
Winners       
Trigger=>5% 8.09% 1.97% -0.99% 0.98% 24.32% 12.07% 
(N = 42 ) (7.77)*** (1.45) (-1.83)* (-0.05)   
 100%:0% 62%:38% 36%:64%  
  
Losers       
Trigger<=-5% -7.23% 0.61% 0.53% 1.14% -8.45% -15.80% 
(N = 85 ) (-7.25)*** (-0.46) (0.82) (0.16)   
 0%:100% 62%:38% 58%:42%  
  
       
Panel B. After-hours 
Winners 
   
 
  
Trigger=>5% 7.35% -0.78% 0.48% -0.30% -10.55% -4.04% 
(N = 45 ) (7.40)*** (-2.21)** (0.51) (-1.30)   
 100%:0% 40%:60% 44%:56%  
  
Losers       
Trigger<=-5% -7.09% 1.97% 0.25% 2.22% -27.82% -31.35% 
(N = 43 ) (-5.04)*** (1.47) (0.13) (1.15)   
 0%:100% 60%:40% 63%:37%  
  
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
During bear market periods, normal-hours winners do not experience mean reversion on 
the two periods following extreme price fluctuations. On the other hand, for the same period 
losers experience a mean reversion equals to 15.80%. 
Comparing to bull market periods, after-hours winners experience a less pronounce 
response in bear market periods. On period 1, the results show a mean reversion equals to 
10.55% and significance at the 5% level, with 60% of winners experiencing negative abnormal 
returns. On the other hand, losers experience greater degree of overreaction during bear market 
periods, with 27.82% of extreme mean abnormal return reverted on the following period. 
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Unlike bull market periods, after-hours losers experience, on average, higher overreaction 
degree than after-hours winners.  
The mean abnormal return differences between normal-hours and after-hours periods 
are presented on table 44.  
Table 44 - Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns during bear market 
periods 
Trigger 
AR Following AR Following  
Mean 
Difference 
T-statistic  Normal-hours 
Trigger 
After-hours 
Trigger 
5% winner 1.97% -0.78% 2.74% (-0.10) 
5% loser 0.61% 1.97% -1.36% (-3.27)*** 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed 
test for significance. 
Winners present a higher difference of mean abnormal return between both periods 
being equal to 2.74%, however with no statistically significance. In case of losers the mean 
difference is equal to -1.36% with significance at the 1% level. 
The analysis by ETF type shows that both types do not experience mean abnormal return 
reversals in case of normal-hours winners. Additionally, both types show higher mean 
reversals during after-hours period. The results could be found on table 45. 
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Table 45 - Test of differences in fixed income mean abnormal returns between ETF types 
during bear market periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As panel B shows, the mean abnormal return difference between both types, in case of 
after-hours losers, is equal to -0.37% and significant at the 1% level. Other differences are not 
statistically significant. A more detail results from this estimation could be found on annex I. 
Overall, we observe a lower degree of overreaction in case of normal-hours extreme 
price movements in both periods. Nonetheless, we find some important differences between 
after-hours triggers. Winners shows greater mean reversion during bull market periods than 
during bear market periods. Losers, on the other hand, experience greater degree of 
overreaction during bear market periods. 
These results suggest that during bull market periods as already pointed out investors 
are more optimistic, overestimating the positive results. On the other hand, during bear market 
periods, investors tend to be more pessimists about the evolution of the market, thus they tend 
to overestimate the negative results. The differences between two market sentiment periods 
are expressed on table 46. 
Panel A. Summary of Abnormal return by Type following a 5% trigger 
 International ETF Broad-Based ETF 
Normal-hours Winners 2.57% 1.83% 
Normal-hours Losers 0.71% 0.57% 
After-hours Winners -0.78% -0.77% 
After-hours Losers 1.71% 2.07% 
   
Panel B. Differences of Abnormal Return  
 AR intl - AR Broad-
Based 
 
Normal-hours Winners 0.74%  
 (0.99)  
Normal-hours Losers 0.14%  
 (-0.03)  
After-hours Winners -0.01%  
 (0.90)  
After-hours Losers -0.37%  
 (-3.09)***  
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
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Table 46 - Test of differences of fixed income mean reversions between bull and bear 
periods 
 Normal-hours After-hours 
Winners -1.90% -2.55% 
 (-0.48) (0.06) 
Losers -0.23% -1.16% 
 (-0.38) (-0.03) 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
Differences are more pronounced among positive abnormal returns during normal-
hours and after-hours periods. However, such differences are not statistically significant. 
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5. Conclusions 
ETF is a quite recent financial market which has been developing at a huge pace over 
the last decade. Their characteristics of being easy to trade and low credit risk are attractive 
for investors. The first equity ETF appears in 1990 while non-equity ETF only appears in 
2000. It is thus understandable the greater development of equity ETF market than others. 
The financial crisis that emerged in 2007 was one of greatest event experienced by 
financial markets. It constitutes also a turning point for ETF industry with a great demand by 
investors since then. So, this study intends to analyse the behaviour of equity and fixed income 
markets returns during and after such event. 
For that, we analyse the extreme price movements (higher than 5% or lower than -5%) 
occurred in US equity and fixed income market ETF between 2007 and 2014. Also, we 
segregate a 24 hours period in two different periods: normal-hours and after-hours period. The 
first includes the market open hours while the second period corresponds to the hours when 
the market is close. Both periods show different characteristics which may be translate in 
different trading behaviour. Therefore, the presence of overreaction is analysed over the first 
24 hours, two periods, after extreme price movement occurs. 
Our main conclusion is that both markets experience a greater level of overreaction 
following after-hours extreme abnormal returns. Moreover, we conclude, in some cases, an 
extension of normal-hours extreme abnormal returns in the following period instead of an 
expected correction. These results may have different interpretations. On the one hand, they 
may suggest the presence of an enough proportion between rational and uninformed/feedback 
traders during normal-hours period, disable irrational investors to create market anomalies. 
After-hours market is characterized by higher transaction costs which make such market less 
attractive for investors. Noise trades have, this way, more opportunities to influence the 
market. Additionally, liquidity levels are much higher on normal-hours than after-hours 
periods, being this period more sensible to deviation from fundamental value. 
The multivariate models for equity and fixed income markets are consistent with these 
estimations results. In case of equity market, the model has a higher explanatory power on 
after-hours period than normal-hours period and shows that abnormal returns following 
extreme abnormal returns are sensible to the magnitude of trigger and their sign. We also 
conclude greater explanatory power in case of winners. Regarding fixed income market, we 
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achieve similar conclusions. Also in this market, we observe a greater explanatory power of 
the model in case of after-hours and winners triggers. Overall, the level of overreaction is, like 
in equity market, influenced by the magnitude and sign of triggers, but also by the abnormal 
volatility presented on the market. These findings are consistent with our previous hypothesis 
of higher efficiency level on ETF market during normal-hours. However, we also may discuss 
about a randomly influenced of noise traders on the market, being not possible distinguish 
ETF characteristics that allow to anticipate abnormal returns. As we referred before, these 
results could be object of different interpretations. 
The analysis by ETF type also enables to conclude that, in case of equity market, 
international ETF experience the greatest level of overreaction during normal-hours period, 
and the lowest level during after-hours period. This could be justified by the composition of 
the underlying (foreign securities), being the information flow and the incorporation of it on 
price different from other types. Also, during after-hours period equity sector ETF experience 
higher level of overreaction which is in line with our expectation since it is the lowest 
diversified type. As already pointed out there are no fixed income sector ETF over our analysis 
period, so we focus on international and broad-based fixed-income ETF. We conclude that 
international ETF experience greater degree of overreaction than broad-based ETF regardless 
the period. 
On a complementary basis, we analyse financial crisis and recovery period separately. 
Regarding equity market, the results enable to conclude that both period experienced an 
identical behaviour as previously discussed with more pronounced reversals following after-
hours triggers. Comparing to recovery period, financial crisis period shows greater level of 
overreaction in both winners and losers following after-hours extreme price movements. On 
fixed income market, reversals are also small during normal-hours periods. After-hours losers 
experience greater response during financial crisis, but after-hours winners show larger 
reversals during recovery period. These findings are in line with expectations, in equity 
market, since financial crisis was a period characterized by greater volatility, thus higher 
probability to anomalies occurs. Fixed income reports mixed results, mainly between after-
hours winners and losers. The lower volatility and development level of such market during 
financial market could influence such results. 
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In another extension of this study, we analyse the pattern of overreaction during bull and 
bear market periods. Regarding ETF equity market, we conclude greater level of overreaction 
during bear market periods. Comparing with losers, winners experience lower level of 
correction during bull market period, while during bear market periods they show the highest 
level of correction, on period 1. Regarding fixed income market, we find the same pattern with 
winners experience a greater response on bull market periods, while losers show a higher level 
of overreaction during bear market periods. Investors, during bull market periods are more 
optimistic, so they tend to overestimate positive movements. On the other hand, during bear 
market periods investors are more pessimists regarding the evolution of the market 
overestimating the negative movements. 
Overall, we are able to conclude greater level of inefficiencies on after-hours market 
period. Financial crisis had a negative influence on this market, mainly in equity market. 
In the present dissertation, we face some limitations that are important to refer. On the 
one hand, ETF fixed income market, during the analysis period, is characterized by low degree 
of development and low liquidity level which could affect the conclusions throughout this 
study. As a consequence, we obtained a more restrictive sample for this market comparing to 
equity ETF market. On the other hand, our study approaches such unique event on financial 
market, so the results could be different for other periods with lower volatility. Finally, the 
present study only analyse a possible reversion on the two following periods after extreme 
price movement occur, longer reversals are not captured. 
The conclusions of this study are very interesting and constitutes a relevant contribute for 
the study of overreaction patterns on ETF industry. Forthcoming analysis may be relevant 
using other periods. Given the huge development of equity ETF market, further analysis 
approaching other markets beyond US market is also an important and relevant study that 
could be done. Finally, this study constitutes a first introduction of overreaction on fixed 
income market. Further analysis approaching such market will be interesting since, nowadays, 
this market is characterized by higher diversity and liquidity level with perspectives of 
continuing to grow. 
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6. Appendix 
6.1. Appendix I – Bull and Bear Market methodology 
In order to distinguish our analysis period between bull and bear market periods we 
apply the Pagan and Sossounov (2003) methodology. They defined bull market as a period of 
an increase on market prices, while bear market corresponds to periods when market price 
tends to decrease. This definition implies the existence of turning points when the market has 
gone from one phase to another. So firstly, it is necessary to determine these turning points 
and afterwards determine the periods. For that, authors defined some rules: 
 The initial turning point should be the highest (lowest) value in a length of eight 
months.  
 Selection of turning point alternating between highest peak and lowest troughs.  
 Not consider turning point founded in the first and last six months of our series.  
 Each cycle, a bull period plus a bear period, should have at least 16 months.  
 Each phase should have duration of at least 4 months, except if price fall/rise more 
than 20%.  
For equity market, we use the close prices of SP500 index, obtained from Bloomberg 
database, in order to estimate the bull and bear market between 2007 and 2014. We achieve a 
total of 5 phases during this period as shown on table 47.   
Table 47 - Equity Market Sentiment Phases during 2007 and 2014 
 
Regarding fixed income market, we apply the same methodology using a benchmark 
index from Bloomberg database: Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Bond Index (Ticker 
Bloomberg: LBUSTRUU Index). In this market, we obtained 7 phases during our analysis 
period, as are shown on table 51. 
Period Months Phase
Jan 07 - Oct 07 10 Bull
Nov 07 -Jul 10 33 Bear
Aug-10-Apr 11 10 Bull
May 11 - Oct 11 5 Bear
Oct 11 - Dec 14 38 Bull
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Table 48 - Fixed income market sentiment phases during 2007 and 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period Months Phase
Jan 07 - Mar 08 15 Bull
Apr 08-Oct 08 6 Bear
Nov 08-Dec 09 11 Bull
Jan 10 - Jun 10 6 Bear
Jul 10 - Oct 12 28 Bull
Nov 12 - Jul 13 9 Bear
Aug 13 - Dec 14 17 Bull
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6.2. Appendix II - Econometric Model 
The analysis data vary across the time, so we start to apply a panel data analysis. Between 
panel data models, we conclude that random effects model is the most appropriate one, once 
we have time-invariant variable. It assumes that ETF’s error term is not correlated with the 
predictors allowing time-invariant variables play a role of explanatory variable. Such 
conclusion was confirmed by Hausman test which test if the unique errors are correlated with 
repressors. If they are correlated, random effects model is the most appropriate test, otherwise 
it would be preferred to use fixed effects model. 
However, if there is no significant differences across different ETF used in our sample, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) turns the model most appropriate to use, since there is no panel 
effect. Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests if there are significant differences across ETF. 
Through that we conclude that there is no significant difference between different ETF used 
in our sample, thus OLS is model more suitable for our analysis. All model presents on this 
dissertation are corrected by heteroscedasticity. 
Thus, the multivariate model for equity ETF market is the following: 
ARi =⁡β0 +⁡β1AFTERHOURSi + β2LOSDUMi +⁡β3TRIGGERi +⁡⁡β4INTLDUMi
+⁡β5SECTDUMi +⁡β6ABN_VOLATILITYi +⁡⁡β7ANB_VOLUMEi
+⁡⁡β8BULLDUMi +⁡β9TAXDUMi + β10⁡Year08⁡ +⁡β11⁡Year09
+ β12⁡Year10⁡ + β13⁡Year11⁡ + β14⁡Year12⁡ + β15⁡Year13⁡ +⁡β16⁡Year14
+⁡εi 
The multivariate model applied in fixed income ETF market is the following: 
ARj =⁡β0 +⁡β1AFTERHOURSi + β2LOSDUMi +⁡β3TRIGGERi +⁡⁡β4INTLDUMi
+⁡β5CORPDUMi +⁡β6ABN_VOLATILITYi +⁡⁡β7ABN_VOLUMEi
+⁡⁡β8BULLDUMi +⁡β9TAXDUMi + β10Year08⁡ + β11⁡Year09
+ β12Year10⁡ + β13Year11⁡ + β14Year12⁡ + β15Year13⁡ + β16Year14 +⁡εi 
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8. Annex 
8.1. Annex I - Bull and Bear Market 
Dividing our equity sample into bull and bear market, we obtained the following 
distribution of our observations: 
Table 49 - Distribution of equity ETF sample that satisfies the 5% trigger divided by bull 
and bear market periods 
  Winners Losers 
Total 
  Normal-hours After-hours Normal-hours After-hours 
Bull Period            
International ETF  275 16% 515 30% 366 21% 577 33% 1733 100% 
Broad-Based ETF 386 29% 259 19% 418 31% 279 21% 1342 100% 
Sector ETF  592 33% 311 17% 621 34% 292 16% 1816 100% 
Entire Sample  1253 26% 1085 22% 1405 29% 1148 23% 4891 100% 
Bear Period            
International ETF  1499 21% 1793 25% 2092 30% 1682 24% 7066 100% 
Broad-Based ETF 3179 32% 1645 16% 3747 37% 1508 15% 10079 100% 
Sector ETF  4158 30% 2498 18% 5263 38% 2107 15% 14026 100% 
Entire Sample  8836 28% 5936 19% 11102 36% 5297 17% 31171 100% 
            
  Total Normal-
hours 
Total After-
hours 
Total Winners Total Losers   
Bull Period            
International ETF  641 24% 1092 49% 790 34% 943 37%   
Broad-Based ETF 804 30% 538 24% 645 28% 697 27%   
Sector ETF  1213 46% 603 27% 903 39% 913 36%   
Entire Sample  2658 100% 2233 100% 2338 100% 2553 100%   
Bear Period            
International ETF  3591 18% 3475 31% 3292 22% 3774 23%   
Broad-Based ETF 6926 35% 3153 28% 4824 33% 5255 32%   
Sector ETFs  9421 47% 4605 41% 6656 45% 7370 45%   
Entire Sample  19938 100% 11233 100% 14772 100% 16399 100%   
 
The following tables, 50 and 51, show the results for the estimation of abnormal returns 
following extreme price movements by ETF types during bull and bear market periods.  
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Table 50 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers by ETF types during bull market 
periods 
        24Hours Proportion of 
Reversion in 
the following 
period 
Proportion of 
Reversion in the 
following 24 
Hours period   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 6.68% -0.35% -0.49% -0.84% -5.30% -12.60% 
(N = 275 ) ( 16.24)*** ( -2.19)** ( -2.77)*** ( -3.66)***   
 100%;0% 42%:58% 42%:58%    
Broad Based ETF 6.72% 0.03% -0.46% -0.43% 0.51% -6.34% 
(N = 386 ) ( 19.34)*** ( -0.25) ( -3.11)*** ( -2.46)**   
 100%;0% 54%:46% 48%:52%    
Sector ETF 6.75% 0.17% -0.30% -0.13% 2.57% -1.93% 
(N = 592 ) ( 24.05)*** ( 0.73) ( -2.66)*** ( -1.40)   
 100%;0% 55%:45% 44%:56%    
    Losers       
International ETF -6.47% 0.25% 0.46% 0.71% -3.93% -11.00% 
(N = 366 ) ( -16.48)*** ( 1.04) ( 2.46)** ( 2.58)***   
 0%;100% 54%:46% 55%:45%    
Broad Based ETF -6.52% -0.12% 0.67% 0.54% 1.88% -8.35% 
(N = 418 ) ( -17.75)*** ( -1.25) ( 3.97)*** ( 1.97)**   
 0%;100% 50%:50% 59%:41%    
Sector ETF -6.53% 0.08% 0.38% 0.47% -1.28% -7.19% 
(N = 621 ) ( -21.69)*** ( 0.05) ( 2.62)*** ( 1.98)**   
 0%;100% 55%:45% 56%:44%    
 
   
Panel B – After-hours    
    Winners       
International ETF 6.76% 0.06% -0.14% -0.08% 0.95% -1.12% 
(N = 515 ) ( 22.45)*** ( -0.08) ( -1.32) ( -1.03)   
 100%;0% 55%:45% 45%:55%    
Broad Based ETF 6.68% -0.43% -0.32% -0.75% -6.36% -11.17% 
(N = 259 ) ( 15.76)*** ( -2.48)** ( -1.85)* ( -3.20)***   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 47%:53%    
Sector ETF 6.69% -0.92% -0.14% -1.06% -13.74% -15.87% 
(N = 311 ) ( 17.28)*** ( -5.39)*** ( -1.04) ( -4.77)***   
 100%;0% 52%:48% 44%:56%    
    Losers       
International ETF -7.01% 0.14% 0.21% 0.34% -1.95% -4.90% 
(N = 577 ) ( -22.53)*** ( 0.45) ( 1.21) ( 1.21)   
 0%;100% 48%:52% 57%:43%    
Broad Based ETF -7.08% 0.68% 0.17% 0.85% -9.67% -12.02% 
(N = 279 ) ( -15.82)*** ( 3.12)*** ( 0.63) ( 2.78)***   
 0%;100% 52%:48% 52%:48%    
Sector ETF -7.12% 1.21% 0.23% 1.43% -16.95% -20.13% 
(N = 292 ) ( -16.28)*** ( 5.93)*** ( 0.97) ( 5.12)***   
 0%;100% 55%:45% 59%:41%    
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
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Table 51 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers by ETF types during bear market 
periods 
    24Hours Proportion 
of Reversion 
in the 
following 
period 
Proportion of 
Reversion in the 
following 24 
Hours period 
 Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours 
Winners       
International ETF 7.57% -0.02% -0.60% -0.63% -0.28% -8.26% 
(N = 1499 ) ( 35.73)*** ( 0.07) ( -5.71)*** ( -4.01)***   
 100%;0% 47%:53% 47%:53%    
Broad Based ETF 7.63% 0.46% -0.59% -0.13% 6.00% -1.75% 
(N = 3179 ) ( 52.40)*** ( 5.17)*** ( -8.17)*** ( -1.92)*   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 49%:51%    
Sector ETF 8.02% 0.34% -0.68% -0.33% 4.25% -4.16% 
(N = 4158 ) ( 62.92)*** ( 4.49)*** ( -10.41)*** ( -4.02)***   
 100%;0% 51%:49% 47%:53%    
Losers       
International ETF -7.34% 0.22% 0.55% 0.78% -3.07% -10.60% 
(N = 2092 ) ( -37.42)*** ( 2.19)** ( 3.75)*** ( 4.32)***   
 0%;100% 54%:46% 60%:40%    
Broad Based ETF -7.63% -0.32% 0.69% 0.37% 4.16% -4.83% 
(N = 3747 ) ( -52.13)*** ( -3.28)*** ( 6.63)*** ( 2.25)**   
 0%;100% 51%:49% 58%:42%    
Sector ETF -7.67% 0.04% 0.74% 0.78% -0.49% -10.15% 
(N = 5263 ) ( -62.11)*** ( 0.93) ( 8.66)*** ( 6.86)***   
 0%;100% 52%:48% 57%:43%    
       
Panel B – After-hours 
Winners       
International ETF 7.50% -1.19% -0.31% -1.50% -15.86% -19.99% 
(N = 1793 ) ( 38.74)*** ( -9.19)*** ( -3.77)*** ( -9.61)***   
 100%;0% 46%:54% 45%:55%    
Broad Based ETF 7.67% -1.97% -0.04% -2.00% -25.68% -26.14% 
(N = 1645 ) ( 37.88)*** ( -14.72)*** ( -1.41) ( -12.08)***   
 100%;0% 42%:58% 45%:55%    
Sector ETF 7.72% -2.57% 0.13% -2.44% -33.29% -31.61% 
(N = 2498 ) ( 46.98)*** ( -23.76)*** ( -0.09) ( -17.96)***   
 100%;0% 38%:62% 47%:53%    
Losers       
International ETF -7.42% 0.97% 0.58% 1.55% -13.06% -20.88% 
(N = 1682 ) ( -33.96)*** ( 7.69)*** ( 3.59)*** ( 8.34)***   
 0%;100% 58%:42% 58%:42%    
Broad Based ETF -7.56% 1.64% 0.45% 2.09% -21.68% -27.67% 
(N = 1508 ) ( -32.78)*** ( 12.15)*** ( 2.41)** ( 10.87)***   
 0%;100% 61%:39% 54%:46%    
Sector ETF -7.84% 2.08% 0.45% 2.53% -26.60% -32.30% 
(N = 2107 ) ( -40.22)*** ( 18.19)*** ( 2.80)*** ( 15.69)***   
 0%;100% 64%:36% 53%:47%    
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
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Dividing our fixed income sample into bull and bear market, we obtain the following 
distribution of observation. 
Table 52 - Distribution of fixed income ETF sample that satisfies the 5% trigger divided by 
bull and bear market periods 
  Winners Losers 
Total 
  Normal-hours After-hours Normal-hours After-hours 
Bull Period           
International ETFs 25 21% 37 31% 46 38% 12 10% 120 100% 
Broad-Based ETFs 58 23% 48 19% 103 42% 38 15% 247 100% 
Entire Sample  83 23% 85 23% 149 41% 50 14% 367 100% 
Bear Period            
International ETFs 8 15% 11 20% 23 43% 12 22% 54 100% 
Broad-Based ETFs 34 21% 34 21% 62 39% 31 19% 161 100% 
Entire Sample 42 20% 45 21% 85 40% 43 20% 215 100% 
           
  Total Normal-
hours 
Total After-
hours 
Total Winners Total Losers   
Bull Period           
International ETFs 71 31% 49 36% 62 37% 58 29%   
Broad-Based ETFs 161 69% 86 64% 106 63% 141 71%   
Entire Sample 232 100% 135 100% 168 100% 199 100%   
Bear Period            
International ETFs 31 24% 23 26% 19 22% 35 27%   
Broad-Based ETFs 96 76% 65 74% 68 78% 93 73%   
Entire Sample 127 100% 88 100% 87 100% 128 100%   
The results of abnormal returns following extreme price movements by ETF types during 
bull and bear market periods are show in the following tables 53 e 54. 
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Table 53 - Abnormal returns following fixed income triggers by ETF types during bull 
market periods 
        24Hours Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following Period 
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period 
  Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period1-
2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours     
    Winners       
International ETF 10.05% 2.57% -1.93% 0.64% 25.52% 6.36% 
(N = 25 ) (6.70)*** (3.61)*** (-2.41)** (1.01)   
 100%:0% 52%:48% 52%:48%    
Broad Based ETF 7.62% 1.83% -0.77% 1.06% 23.95% 13.84% 
(N = 58 ) (7.89)*** (4.17)*** (-1.46) (2.11)**   
 100%:0% 43%:57% 55%:45%    
Losers       
International ETF -7.65% 0.71% 0.80% 1.51% -9.33% -19.73% 
(N = 46 ) (-5.97)*** (1.93)* (1.37) (2.43)**   
 0%;100% 67%:33% 59%:41%    
Broad Based ETF -7.07% 0.57% 0.43% 1.01% -8.09% -14.22% 
(N = 103 ) (-8.19)*** (2.55)** (1.13) (2.72)***   
 0%;100% 53%:47% 47%:53%    
       
Panel B – After-hours    
Winners       
International ETF 7.93% -4.24% 0.02% -4.22% -53.51% -53.26% 
(N = 37 ) (6.53)*** (-5.39)*** (0.04) (-4.04)***   
 100%:0% 22%:78% 57%:43%    
Broad Based ETF 6.87% -2.61% -0.22% -2.83% -38.07% -41.25% 
(N = 48 ) (6.52)*** (-3.47)*** (-0.37) (-2.88)***   
 100%:0% 31%:69% 50%:50%    
    Losers       
International ETF -7.49% 1.98% 1.13% 3.10% -26.40% -41.44% 
(N = 12 ) (-2.98)*** (2.02)** (0.99) (2.23)**   
 0%;100% 83%:17% 75%:25%    
Broad Based ETF -7.09% 0.63% -0.10% 0.52% -8.82% -7.35% 
(N = 38 ) (-4.99)*** (1.63) (-0.15) (1.12)   
 0%;100% 47%:53% 47%:53%    
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
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Table 54 - Abnormal returns following fixed income triggers by ETF types during bear 
market periods 
    24Hour
s 
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following Period 
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period 
 Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period
1-2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours 
Winners       
International ETF 10.05% 2.57% -1.93% 0.64% 25.52% 6.36% 
(N = 8 ) (4.11)*** (0.97) (-1.44) (-0.16)   
 100%:0% 63%:38% 25%:75%    
Broad Based ETF 7.62% 1.83% -0.77% 1.06% 23.95% 13.84% 
(N = 34 ) (6.64)*** (1.14) (-1.33) (0.03)   
 100%:0% 62%:38% 38%:62%    
Losers       
International ETF -7.65% 0.71% 0.80% 1.51% -9.33% -19.73% 
(N = 23 ) (-4.04)*** (-0.14) (0.73) (0.34)   
 0%;100% 57%:43% 65%:35%    
Broad Based ETF -7.07% 0.57% 0.43% 1.01% -8.09% -14.22% 
(N = 62 ) (-6.04)*** (-0.45) (0.51) (-0.02)   
 0%;100% 65%:35% 55%:45%    
       
Panel B – After-hours 
Winners       
International ETF 8.09% -0.78% -0.74% -1.52% -9.67% -18.76% 
(N = 11 ) (3.98)*** (-1.10) (-0.73) (-1.24)   
 100%:0% 36%:64% 36%:64%    
Broad Based ETF 7.11% -0.77% 0.87% 0.10% -10.88% 1.37% 
(N = 34 ) (6.25)*** (-1.92)* (1.00) (-0.79)   
 100%:0% 41%:59% 47%:53%    
Losers       
International ETF -7.66% 1.71% -0.23% 1.47% -22.26% -19.19% 
(N = 12 ) (-2.92)*** (0.59) (-0.34) (0.23)   
 0%;100% 67%:33% 67%:33%    
Broad Based ETF -6.86% 2.07% 0.44% 2.51% -30.22% -36.61% 
(N = 31 ) (-4.12)*** (1.36) (0.37) (1.22)   
 0%;100% 58%:42% 61%:39%    
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
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8.2. Annex II - Tables from financial crisis and recovery period analysis 
 
8.2.1. Equity Market 
Table 55 - Distribution of equity ETF sample that satisfies the 5% trigger divided by 
financial crisis and recovery period 
  Winners Losers 
Total 
  
Normal-hours After-hours 
Normal-
hours 
After-hours 
Financial Crisis - October 9 2007 to March 9 2009   
International ETFs  1096 22% 1126 23% 1539 31% 1143 23% 4904 100% 
Broad-Based ETFs  2249 31% 1164 16% 2719 38% 1091 15% 7223 100% 
Sector ETFs  2713 29% 1650 17% 3616 38% 1472 16% 9451 100% 
Entire Sample  6058 28% 3940 18% 7874 36% 3706 17% 21578 100% 
Recovery Period -March 9,2009 to December 31, 2014 
International ETFs  672 17% 1177 30% 917 24% 1109 29% 3875 100% 
Broad-Based ETFs  1287 31% 722 18% 1413 34% 687 17% 4104 100% 
Sector ETFs  1993 32% 1141 18% 2237 36% 914 15% 6285 100% 
Entire Sample  3952 28% 3040 21% 4567 32% 2710 19% 14264 100% 
            
   
Total Normal-
hours 
Total After-
hours 
Total 
Winners Total Losers   
Financial Crisis - October 9 2007 to March 9 2009   
International ETFs  2635 19% 2269 30% 2222 22% 2682 23%   
Broad-Based ETFs  4968 36% 2255 29% 3413 34% 3810 33%   
Sector ETFs  6329 45% 3122 41% 4363 44% 5088 44%   
Entire Sample   13932 100% 7646 100% 9998 100% 11580 100%   
Recovery Period -March 9,2009 to December 31, 2014  
International ETFs  1589 11% 2286 30% 1849 18% 2026 17%   
Broad-Based ETFs  2700 19% 1409 18% 2009 20% 2100 18%   
Sector ETFs  4230 30% 2055 27% 3134 31% 3151 27%   
Entire Sample   8519 100% 5750 100% 6992 100% 7277 100%   
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Table 56 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers by ETF types during financial crisis 
period 
     24Hours Proportion of 
the Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 
Period 
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 7.75% -0.08% -0.61% -0.69% -1.04% -8.91% 
(N = 1096 ) ( 30.66)*** ( -0.32) ( -4.47)*** ( -3.42)***   
 100%;0% 45%:55% 47%:53% 
   
Broad Based ETF 7.85% 0.62% -0.65% -0.02% 7.96% -0.29% 
(N = 2249 ) ( 44.46)*** ( 5.40)*** ( -6.75)*** ( -0.69)   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 48%:52% 
   
Sector ETF 8.23% 0.44% -0.67% -0.22% 5.39% -2.72% 
(N = 2713 ) ( 51.05)*** ( 4.28)*** ( -7.60)*** ( -2.15)**   
 100%;0% 51%:49% 47%:53% 
   
    Losers       
International ETF -7.41% 0.18% 0.55% 0.73% -2.49% -9.92% 
(N = 1539 ) ( -30.36)*** ( 1.45) ( 3.21)*** ( 3.38)***   
 0%;100% 54%:46% 61%:39% 
   
Broad Based ETF -7.88% -0.45% 0.66% 0.20% 5.77% -2.58% 
(N = 2719 ) ( -43.13)*** ( -3.91)*** ( 5.33)*** ( 0.81)   
 0%;100% 49%:51% 59%:41% 
   
Sector ETF -7.91% -0.09% 0.49% 0.40% 1.15% -5.03% 
(N = 3616 ) ( -49.94)*** ( -0.68) ( 4.24)*** ( 2.49)**   
 0%;100% 50%:50% 56%:44% 
   
       
Panel B – After-hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 7.58% -1.23% -0.24% -1.47% -16.17% -19.35% 
(N = 1126 ) ( 30.43)*** ( -7.04)*** ( -2.22)** ( -6.92)***   
 100%;0% 47%:53% 46%:54% 
   
Broad Based ETF 8.05% -2.85% 0.11% -2.74% -35.35% -33.96% 
(N = 1164 ) ( 32.76)*** ( -16.84)*** ( -0.01) ( -12.78)***   
 100%;0% 37%:63% 47%:53% 
   
Sector ETF 8.03% -3.08% 0.33% -2.75% -38.29% -34.23% 
(N = 1650 ) ( 38.91)*** ( -21.68)*** ( 1.62) ( -15.29)***   
 100%;0% 35%:65% 50%:50% 
   
    Losers       
International ETF -7.57% 1.40% 0.44% 1.84% -18.49% -24.34% 
(N = 1143 ) ( -26.76)*** ( 8.43)*** ( 2.09)** ( 7.88)***   
 0%;100% 62%:38% 54%:46% 
   
Broad Based ETF -7.81% 2.57% 0.40% 2.97% -32.91% -38.02% 
(N = 1091 ) ( -27.07)*** ( 15.01)*** ( 1.77)* ( 12.65)***   
 0%;100% 68%:32% 51%:49% 
   
Sector ETF -8.14% 2.42% 0.42% 2.84% -29.73% -34.93% 
(N = 1472 ) ( -32.84)*** ( 16.42)*** ( 2.22)** ( 14.04)***   
 0%;100% 67%:33% 50%:50% 
   
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance 
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Table 57 - Abnormal returns following equity triggers by ETF types during recovery period 
  
    24Hours Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following Period 
Proportion of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours Period   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period1-2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 6.91% -0.07% -0.56% -0.63% -1.02% -9.08% 
(N = 672 ) ( 24.18)*** ( -0.41) ( -4.60)*** ( -3.62)***   
 100%;0% 48%:52% 46%:54% 
   
Broad Based ETF 6.95% 0.04% -0.46% -0.41% 0.62% -5.94% 
(N = 1287 ) ( 33.66)*** ( 0.44) ( -5.44)*** ( -3.61)***   
 100%;0% 49%:51% 50%:50% 
   
Sector ETF 7.39% 0.13% -0.59% -0.46% 1.74% -6.18% 
(N = 1993 ) ( 44.50)*** ( 1.51) ( -8.24)*** ( -4.85)***   
 100%;0% 52%:48% 45%:55% 
   
    Losers       
International ETF -6.88% 0.30% 0.52% 0.83% -4.43% -12.02% 
(N = 917 ) ( -27.49)*** ( 2.36)** ( 2.88)*** ( 3.80)***   
 0%;100% 54%:46% 56%:44% 
   
Broad Based ETF -6.83% 0.04% 0.71% 0.75% -0.60% -10.99% 
(N = 1413 ) ( -33.86)*** ( 0.45) ( 5.36)*** ( 4.19)***   
 0%;100% 53%:47% 57%:43% 
   
Sector ETF -6.96% 0.27% 1.06% 1.33% -3.83% -19.05% 
(N = 2237 ) ( -43.45)*** ( 3.22)*** ( 10.92)*** ( 10.24)***   
 0%;100% 56%:44% 59%:41% 
   
       
Panel B – After-hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 7.11% -0.60% -0.31% -0.91% -8.49% -12.80% 
(N = 1177 ) ( 32.90)*** ( -5.12)*** ( -3.91)*** ( -6.56)***   
 100%;0% 50%:50% 43%:57% 
   
Broad Based ETF 6.69% 0.04% -0.39% -0.35% 0.61% -5.18% 
(N = 722 ) ( 24.25)*** ( 0.32) ( -3.61)*** ( -2.38)**   
 100%;0% 55%:45% 41%:59% 
   
Sector ETF 6.98% -1.37% -0.23% -1.60% -19.66% -22.97% 
(N = 1141 ) ( 31.80)*** ( -11.53)*** ( -3.20)*** ( -10.72)***   
 100%;0% 46%:54% 43%:57% 
   
    Losers       
International ETF -7.06% 0.06% 0.52% 0.58% -0.85% -8.15% 
(N = 1109 ) ( -31.03)*** ( 0.55) ( 3.11)*** ( 2.65)***   
 0%;100% 49%:51% 61%:39% 
   
Broad Based ETF -6.88% -0.34% 0.43% 0.09% 4.92% -1.29% 
(N = 687 ) ( -23.80)*** ( -2.18)** ( 1.87)* ( -0.24)   
 0%;100% 46%:54% 58%:42% 
   
Sector ETF -7.11% 1.23% 0.42% 1.65% -17.30% -23.23% 
(N = 914 ) ( -28.38)*** ( 9.34)*** ( 2.11)** ( 8.34)***   
 0%;100% 56%:44% 59%:41% 
   
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance 
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8.2.2.Fixed Income 
Table 58 - Distribution of fixed income ETF sample that satisfies the 5% trigger divided by 
financial crisis and recovery period 
  Winners Losers 
Total 
    Normal-hours After-hours 
Normal-
hours After-hours 
Financial Crisis Period - Oct 9,2007 to Mar 9, 2009 
International ETFs 23 21% 24 22% 46 42% 16 15% 109 100% 
Broad-Based ETFs 41 22% 35 19% 87 47% 24 13% 187 100% 
Entire Sample 64 22% 59 20% 133 45% 40 14% 296 100% 
Recovery Period - Mar 9, 2009 to Dec 31, 2014 
International ETFs 10 16% 24 38% 22 34% 8 13% 64 100% 
Broad-Based ETFs 51 23% 47 21% 78 35% 45 20% 221 100% 
Entire Sample 61 21% 71 25% 100 35% 53 19% 285 100% 
            
  
Total Normal-
hours 
Total After-
hours 
Total 
Winners Total Losers   
Financial Crisis Period - Oct 9,2007 to Mar 9, 2009 
International ETFs 69 35% 40 40% 47 38% 62 36%   
Broad-Based ETFs 128 65% 59 60% 76 62% 111 64%   
Entire Sample 197 100% 99 100% 123 100% 173 100%   
Recovery Period - Mar 9, 2009 to Dec 31, 2014 
International ETFs 32 20% 32 26% 34 26% 30 20%   
Broad-Based ETFs 129 80% 92 74% 98 74% 123 80%   
Entire Sample 161 100% 124 100% 132 100% 153 100%   
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Table 59 - Abnormal returns following fixed income trigger by ETF types during financial 
crisis period 
  
   24Hours Proportion 
of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the 
Following 
Period 
Proportion 
of the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in 
the 
Following 24 
Hours   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period1-
2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours       
    Winners 
      
International ETF 8.44% 1.26% -1.51% -0.25% 14.95% -2.94% 
(N = 23 ) (5.75)*** (0.60) (-1.38) (-0.55) 
  
 100%:0% 48%:52% 35%:65% 
   
Broad Based ETF 8.09% 1.72% -0.71% 1.00% 21.22% 12.39% 
(N = 41 ) (7.40)*** (1.41) (-0.81) (0.40) 
  
 100%:0% 66%:34% 49%:51% 
   
Losers 
      
International ETF -7.83% 0.92% 0.58% 1.50% -11.81% -19.21% 
(N = 46 ) (-5.73)*** (0.38) (0.92) (0.92) 
  
 0%:100% 65%:35% 59%:41% 
   
Broad Based ETF -7.24% 0.19% -0.37% -0.18% -2.66% 2.42% 
(N = 87 ) (-7.19)*** (-0.87) (-0.53) (-0.98) 
  
 0%:100% 55%:45% 45%:55% 
   
       
Panel B – After-hours 
      
Winners 
      
International ETF 7.98% -1.73% 0.02% -1.72% -21.73% -21.50% 
(N = 24 ) (5.59)*** (-2.40)** (0.11) (-1.60) 
  
 100%:0% 29%:71% 50%:50% 
   
Broad Based ETF 6.92% -0.75% 1.01% 0.27% -10.78% 3.87% 
(N = 35 ) (5.97)*** (-1.70)* (1.33) (-0.25) 
  
 0%:100% 23%:77% 40%:60% 
   
    Losers 
      
International ETF -7.68% 2.22% 0.45% 2.67% -28.89% -34.78% 
(N = 16 ) (-3.30)*** (1.29) (0.44) (1.21) 
  
 100%:0% 75%:25% 75%:25% 
   
Broad Based ETF -7.23% 2.73% 0.00% 2.73% -37.76% -37.73% 
(N = 24 ) (-3.77)*** (2.10)** (0.09) (1.52) 
  
 0%:100% 67%:33% 46%:54% 
   
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for 
significance. 
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Table 60 - Abnormal returns following fixed income trigger by ETF types during recovery 
period 
        24Hours Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 
Period 
Proportion of 
the 
Overreaction 
Reversed in the 
Following 24 
Hours   
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 
(Period1-
2) 
Panel A – Normal-hours 
    Winners       
International ETF 7.90% 0.50% 0.39% 0.89% 6.32% 11.21% 
(N = 10 ) (3.42)*** (0.89) (0.20) (0.84) 
  
 100%:0% 40%:60% 40%:60% 
   
Broad Based ETF 6.88% -0.32% 0.01% -0.31% -4.72% -4.53% 
(N = 51 ) (6.79)*** (0.58) (-0.50) (0.20) 
  
 100%:0% 37%:63% 37%:63% 
   
Losers       
International ETF -7.71% 0.69% 0.87% 1.56% -8.95% -20.24% 
(N = 22 ) (-4.32)*** (1.53) (1.10) (1.87)* 
  
 0%;100% 59%:41% 64%:36% 
   
Broad Based ETF -7.25% 0.42% 0.57% 0.99% -5.76% -13.58% 
(N = 78 ) (-7.62)*** (2.31)** (1.13) (2.52)** 
  
 0%;100% 60%:40% 55%:45% 
   
       
Panel B – After-hours       
Winners       
International ETF 7.95% -5.16% -0.32% -5.49% -64.97% -69.05% 
(N = 24 ) (5.32)*** (-5.33)*** (-0.93) (-4.88)*** 
  
 100%:0% 17%:83% 50%:50% 
   
Broad Based ETF 7.00% -2.67% -0.35% -3.02% -38.19% -43.16% 
(N = 47 ) (6.62)*** (-3.33)*** (-1.36) (-3.49)*** 
  
 100%:0% 36%:64% 45%:55% 
   
    Losers 
      
International ETF -6.87% 0.46% 0.24% 0.71% -6.75% -10.30% 
(N = 8 ) (-2.30)*** (0.77) (0.04) (0.65) 
  
 100%:0% 75%:25% 63%:38% 
   
Broad Based ETF -7.38% 1.09% 0.43% 1.52% -14.77% -20.65% 
(N = 45 ) (-5.90)*** (2.84)*** (0.54) (2.63)*** 
  
 100%:0% 44%:56% 58%:42% 
   
Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics 
*, ** and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively using a 2-tailed test for significance. 
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8.3. Annex III - Data supporting figures 
 
Table 61 - Equity mean reversion in the following two periods by year 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Winners -1.70% -0.96% -1.24% -0.90% -0.30% -0.58% -0.51% 0.02% 
 (322) (8533) (4057) (1219) (1960) (425) (274) (320) 
Losers 1.63% 0.98% 1.71% 0.62% 0.50% 0.85% 0.65% -0.06% 
 (346) (9487) (4331) (1249) (2323) (469) (336) (411) 
The number of observation in each year could be found in parentheses 
 
Table 62 - Equity mean reversion following normal-hours triggers by year 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Normal-hours 
winners  
-0.07% -0.09% -0.65% -0.60% -0.74% -0.19% -0.15% 0.44% 
 
(200) (5202) (2436) (660) (1026) (212) (170) (183) 
Normal-hours 
losers 
0.63% 0.13% 1.69% 0.53% 1.01% 0.40% 0.36% 
-
0.43% 
 
(260) (6419) (3059) (844) (1218) (252) (205) (250) 
The number of observation in each year could be found in parentheses 
 
Table 63 - Equity mean reversion following after-hours triggers by year 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
After-hours 
winners 
-4.36% -2.32% -2.12% -1.26% 0.18% -0.97% -1.10% -0.53% 
 (122) (3331) (1621) (559) (933) (213) (104) (137) 
After-hours 
losers 
4.65% 2.78% 1.76% 0.80% -0.06% 1.37% 1.10% 0.50% 
 (86) (3068) (1272) (405) (1105) (217) (131) (161) 
The number of observation in each year could be found in parentheses 
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Table 64 - Fixed income mean reversion in the following two periods by year 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Winners -7.38% 0.73% -2.47% -4.68% -0.72% -1.48% -1.58% -1.04% 
 (1) (99) (58) (27) (40) (17) (9) (4) 
Losers 1.11% 1.24% 0.68% 1.74% 0.31% 0.57% 0.54% 0.89% 
 (3) (125) (76) (39) (48) (21) (9) (6) 
The number of observation in each year could be found in parentheses 
 
Table 65 - Fixed Income mean reversion following after-hours triggers by year 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Normal-hours 
winners 
-7.38% 1.21% 0.63% -1.55% -0.52% -0.58% -1.72% -0.53% 
 (1) (50) (27) (13) (22) (7) (3) (2) 
Normal-hours 
losers 
1.11% 0.78% 0.43% 1.35% 0.73% 0.29% 1.99% -0.79% 
 (3) (92) (64) (25) (29) (13) (4) (4) 
The number of observation in each year could be found in parentheses 
 
Table 66 - Fixed Income mean reversion following after-hours triggers by year 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
After-hours 
winners 
- 0.24% -5.17% -7.58% -0.97% -2.12% -1.51% -1.54% 
 (0) (49) (31) (14) (18) (10) (6) (2) 
After-hours 
losers 
- 2.52% 1.98% 2.44% -0.32% 1.04% -0.62% 4.25% 
 (0) (33) (12) (14) (19) (8) (5) (2) 
The number of observation in each year could be found in parentheses 
 
